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Journal of Administration Overseas

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by Richard Wood

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by John Connell

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by John Bowers, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie,
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M. J. Campbell

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Contents

Editor's Notes 223

The Place of British Assistance in World Development
by Richard Wood 224

Administrative Training in Guinea
by 'Ladipo Adamolekun 233

Training Senior Administrators for Independence in Fiji
by A. R. Hoyle 253

Bottlenecks in the Zambian Labour Situation
by Patrick Ohadike 260

Ujamaa Villages in Rural Tanzania
by John Connell 273

Quarterly Notes: 284
- Legal Training in Britain
- The Duncan Ndegwa Report on the Kenya Public Service
- The Wamalwa Report on Training in Kenya
- Studies of British Aid
- Local Government in Sierra Leone
- Conference on Land Law in the Commonwealth

Book Reviews 291

Book Notes 306

Editor's Notes

"Man's hope is in man" (Rumanian proverb)

THE Rt. Hon. Richard Wood has been the Minister responsible for overseas development since the Conservative Government took office after the General Election of 1970. We are very glad to publish his paper on British Assistance to developing countries which he presented in London in the month preceding UNCTAD III. The growth of populations and the massive scale of unemployment, and of underemployment, closely inter-related as they are, are singled out as the most critical problems facing the Third World – social problems difficult to solve but requiring solution if development programmes are to be really meaningful to the urban and rural peoples of the Third World.

The management of every programme must depend very considerably on the competence of the administrative machine. Two contrasting methods of administrative training are described in this Number: 'Ladipo Adamolekun examines Guinea where the training besides the usual features of an Administrative syllabus, places unusual emphasis on political philosophy; this leads to a major intellectual problem within the public service, yet to be resolved. The administrator must be declared ideologically fit for graduation from the Guinea Territorial School of Administration and his subsequent postings and career prospects depend largely on Party approval. A. R. Hoyle, on the other hand, describes the orthodox British-style (albeit crash-course) methods adopted in Fiji to prepare local administrators for their new responsibilities at independence. The training provided proved well worthwhile but the lesson learnt was the need to plan sufficiently well ahead to avoid recourse to crash courses mounted at short notice. Another aspect of development programme control is looked at by Patrick Ohadike who provides a follow up to the picture of Zambian manpower contributed by Hugh Thompson in our April issue. He sees decentralization of government's activities, emphasis on rural development and technical education, on family planning and an improvement in the quality of labour, as Zambia's principal policy requirements.

We conclude with John Connell's study of the radical new form of rural institution – *Vijiji vya Ujamaa* – upon which the Tanzania Government now bases its rural policy. The problems besetting an attempt to establish an egalitarian village system are sympathetically examined. Certainly Tanzania leaders have faith and hope in their novel venture but in this early formulation stage of new-village development they are very modest in their claims as to achievement so far and well realise the difficulties that lie ahead, particularly in the more prosperous rural areas. John Connell will help those political scientists who seem to believe the way to a rural Utopia has now been found, to take a more balanced view of the realities involved.

The Place of British Assistance in World Development*

By RICHARD WOOD

The Rt. Hon. Richard Wood, Member of Parliament, is Minister for Overseas Development.

I THINK this is the first address on the whole subject of aid and development which the Royal Society of Arts has heard since Sir Andrew Cohen spoke on technical assistance in March, 1963.

Sir Andrew was then Director-General of the Department of Technical Co-operation. He probably knew more about that subject than anyone in Britain, possibly than anyone in the whole world. His was the Government Department which managed Britain's technical assistance programme. Before long it became the nucleus of a new Department, the Ministry of Overseas Development. Its purpose was to decide and carry out British policies to help the economic development of less developed countries, and it was responsible for the management of every part of the Aid Programme. Andrew Cohen became its first Permanent Secretary and continued there until he died four years ago.

As part of the reorganization of government in 1970, my Department became a functional wing of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and is now known as the Overseas Development Administration (more succinctly as ODA), but its responsibilities have not changed. Just as in 1964, when the Ministry of Overseas Development came into being, so in 1972 one single Government Department continues to carry through the policies and the management, not only of technical assistance, but also of bilateral and multilateral financial aid. But "Aid" is not part of the title, either of the Overseas Development Administration, or of its predecessor. The provision of aid is the means to an end. My concern is with development and with programmes designed to help achieve it.

The richer nations should be prepared to help developing countries to create an educational system adapted to economic growth, and to assist in building an efficient and dedicated administrative service, an intelligent class of farmers, and a disciplined, skilled and adaptable agricultural and industrial labour force. We must help the governments of these countries develop financial institutions and markets, and establish communications like roads, railways and harbours. The object of aid – not only from Britain but from all who provide it – is to promote the economic growth of poorer countries; but it is now becoming more and more widely recognized that economic growth is not an end in itself but a means towards the development of more just societies. I believe that it is important for us always to keep this more fundamental objective very much in mind.

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*This article is composed of major extracts from a paper presented by Mr. Wood to the Royal Society of Arts on March 28, 1972, and is published here with the kind permission of the Society.

Only a short time ago everyone seemed to agree that the key problem was likely to be the shortage of food. Many prophesied a world famine, some said in the early 1970s. There is still great anxiety today about the rate of food production, and about food distribution, but I doubt whether many people think it is, in isolation, the major problem for the future.

New strains of rice, wheat, maize and other food crops, together with fertilizers and new methods of increasing yields, give ground for cautious optimism about the volume of food production. This, unfortunately, does not mean that everyone has enough to eat; but, at least, the experts seem to have established the technical possibilities of feeding the world's population, even though that population is growing with bewildering rapidity. Nevertheless, there are millions of people in developing countries who do not benefit from the green revolution. Far too many still produce nothing, or very little, for sale over and above what they consume. They therefore have no means of buying food (or other goods) produced elsewhere. Even those who are able to produce a surplus often lack marketing facilities and know little about distribution and storage.

Yet, in spite of all these gaps, the hunger and malnutrition of millions is no longer the insoluble problem it seemed a short time ago. We know how to grow more food; and the world has learned that the problem of hunger cannot be considered in isolation from the overall needs of a developing society.

Today there are two problems which appear more critical than the food shortage. Their solution looks like being infinitely more difficult. The first is the growth of populations. Millions of new human beings have inspired millions of words, both written and spoken, and I do not want to spend too much time on it. In developing countries, the problem is caused by the combination of a medieval birth rate and a twentieth-century death rate. In the poorer countries the rate of population growth is five or six times that in Britain. If not effectively checked, the world's population will double by the year 2000, less than twenty-eight years away. The economic and environmental consequences of this will not be confined to the less developed countries alone; and growth on this scale, and at this pace, will frustrate nearly all the development objectives which the world has set itself.

But grave as the problem is, there is no quick solution. One weapon must be family planning; easier, unfortunately, to advocate than to establish on a large scale. In certain communities it is a very sensitive matter, and not only for religious reasons. To a great many rural people in the developing world, who have no understanding of the wider problem, more children means simply more hands to the plough.

Many enlightened governments see the wisdom of family limitation, but they have to persuade ordinary people in remote villages. Such people might be easier to convince if they saw round them an improvement in economic and social circumstances. Smaller families might then become more acceptable; but how will those circumstances improve while governments in the poorer countries have to divert resources from productive investment simply to maintain, for the rapidly increasing numbers of people, the existing low level and low coverage of education, health services and so on? This is the vicious circle – the evil chain that binds more than half of mankind.

The second, even greater, and perhaps more immediate problem, closely allied to the growth of populations, is unemployment and underemployment on a massive scale. The present number of people unemployed in Britain causes much anxiety, but unemployment in many developing countries is frequently at far higher levels than we in this country have ever experienced. This is only the tip of the iceberg, for there are millions more who, for one reason or another, contribute little to production and whose capacity to support themselves is alarmingly small. The present situation is bad enough; but the future gives me deep concern.

The population of working age in developing countries will increase by one-quarter in the next decade. This does not sound particularly formidable, but it means that the developing countries are faced, between 1970 and 1980, with the problem of finding productive work for about 170 million people – more than eight times our total working population in Britain. If the urban population in India continues its present rate of growth, the equivalent of a city the size of Calcutta will be created every two years.

The scale of this challenge is incomparably greater than any earlier challenge to this or any other of the rich countries; and we shall all face the consequences of a failure to meet it.

Some of the steps which are urgently necessary are already receiving attention under our aid programme. In our aid to education, we are determined to do our best to avoid a situation where young people may be educated into unemployment, finding themselves in urban societies with a bit of knowledge and training, tragically equipped to do jobs that are not yet there to be done.

I do not want to be gloomier than the situation deserves. Industrial development is taking place in many developing countries, but it is round agriculture that jobs have to be found, and, where there are thousands of urban unemployed, there is even more need to create conditions which will discourage further movement to towns and cities. I believe that we should, for this reason, concentrate on assistance for schemes of rural development, where small-scale industries and services complement agricultural production.

In helping people to cope with their own problems and in providing the technical assistance that enables them in the long run to manage better for themselves, I am sure that we must guard against perpetuating in other countries the errors we have made in our own. We must also avoid, or stop, transferring to them technologies – ways of doing things – which may be appropriate in our own stage of development but are quite unsuited to others, whose needs are entirely different.

In developing countries, where labour is on the whole cheaper than in the United States and Europe, labour-saving equipment is not the great need. Countries like Britain have over the years developed capital-intensive machinery. In some situations within developing countries, this can be disastrous. I am certainly not saying that the most efficient machinery is inappropriate for all developing countries; nor am I saying that we export only the second best; but I am asking for consideration to be given to completely new ways of doing things. As far as the suppliers of help are concerned, it may mean that "technical assistance", so long a key part of our aid programme, takes on a new and literal meaning which it has not had before. Instead of merely supplying experts and teachers, we may be asked for greater co-operation in the evolution of these new technologies.

We shall have to draw on the resources of our universities, private firms and institutions to work with the expert in the less developed countries to evolve by experiment the new sort of equipment that will meet their needs. The main objective will be what has been called constructive job provision. The Intermediate Technology Group have been pioneers in this field, and I have been impressed by the way their activities have developed in recent years. We have been able to finance a small part of their research, and we are also supporting special studies at the University of Strathclyde.

It is not Britain alone which has solutions to these problems, or is feeling the way towards them. Ideas must come from everywhere. This is clearly understood in the context of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (the OECD), in the Commonwealth connection, and in international exchanges between nations.

The amount of British public money available for development overseas is decided by the Government and by Parliament, but the size and shape of our aid programme cannot be divorced either from the international compass of the development problem, or from the flow of world resources from richer to poorer countries. Nor can our aid effort make sense except as an exercise in co-operation, not only with the other aid-giving nations and international agencies but, even more importantly, with developing countries themselves. This kind of co-operation is fundamental to our operations.

In general, we provide aid on a bilateral government-to-government basis, if we are satisfied that the development plans submitted to us, and the projects and schemes within those plans, have a developmental value and promise eventually to raise living standards and improve the quality of life. These conditions are often misunderstood. Even those most enthusiastic for aid often suggest that our aid programme forces unwanted capital equipment on the recipients. Some say the opposite – that we ought to provide this or that, regardless of the wishes of the receiving government. I am myself convinced that I should not be helping the development effort if I tried to impose my views on developing countries by telling them how they should conduct their affairs or their development. It is through the process of consultation and co-operation that we try to find an identity of view about the priorities in the development plans of individual countries, particularly on the economic and social changes they will bring about.

In setting out the broad facts of the international effort, it should be remembered that the international effort cannot be measured only by the amount of money deployed. If our objective is, as I earlier suggested it should be, the development of societies, measurement is clearly difficult. Yet some form of measurement is important, and I shall be referring later to the achievements under the various international aid targets.

Something like one-seventh of British aid is now channelled through international organizations, like the United Nations Development Programme, the regional development banks and, largest of all, the International Development Association, the soft loan agency of the World Bank. The World Bank has gathered a great deal of development expertise, and there are advantages in providing assistance through this multilateral organization, including the easy terms under which World Bank development money is made available to poorer nations.

We have also found that our bilateral aid can be sometimes applied more usefully and more sensibly in co-operation with other donors. Britain is a member of several aid consortia, for example for India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Turkey and Indonesia. Within each of these consortia, donors can discuss the overall development of the country concerned with the representative of that country, who is always a member. The other members can decide which sector of development they can best help. Other machinery, like the Colombo Plan, helps in the evaluation of progress in development and the flow of assistance.

Membership of the European Economic Community will not have any direct effect on the general conduct of our aid policies. It will certainly remind us that both France and Germany contribute more financially than we do. Britain will also have to contribute to the European Development Fund, and to co-operate with our Continental partners in its administration. The Fund comes up for renewal in 1974 and provides aid to developing countries which are associated with the European Community.

All the present members of the Community, and indeed all other nations, are concerned as we are with the United Nations Second Development Decade. When the General Assembly of the United Nations designated the 1960s as a development decade, quantitative targets were recommended both for developing countries and for the richer nations who provided the aid for development. Some of the targets were achieved, others were not. Perhaps the most significant success was the achievement by the developing countries of an average 5 per cent annual growth rate by the end of the decade. The performance was uneven and, as we are now well aware, was unable to prevent the levels of unemployment in many countries from rising sharply; but about four-fifths of investment in developing countries came from their own resources and only about one-fifth through the flow of resources from the economically advanced countries. Developed nations were meanwhile less successful in reaching the quantitative targets that they had had prescribed for them.

Well before the end of the 1960s, it became clear that a new strategy was necessary to cope with the problems of development. The General Assembly proclaimed the 1970s as the Second Development Decade (more conveniently known as DD2). At the same time it adopted, with some reservations, a detailed Strategy which outlined the commitments and policy measures required to achieve development aims.

The Strategy recommended a number of quantitative goals and objectives for both developing and developed countries. The more obvious targets concerned the volume of aid and economic growth in the less developed countries; but the Strategy also opens up opportunities to measure quality, as well as quantity, in development achievement. The Strategy emphasizes social conditions and injustices as well as economic progress; it suggests that the ultimate objective of development must be a sustained improvement in the well-being of the individual; and it says that development is the essential path to peace and justice.

The World Bank is an institution you might expect to be concerned with financial rather than social indicators of progress, but it was Robert McNamara, its President, who said that gross measures of economic strength and gross measures of economic growth, necessary as they are, cannot measure the soundness of the social structure of a nation. We certainly cannot hope adequately to measure the adequacy of our own contribution if we set it apart from the success of any individual country which is concerned to develop its society.

Helped by substantial flows of aid, developing countries have already made significant advances in skills and infrastructure. This has created wider opportunities for the productive use of financial and technical assistance, but again I must emphasize that the quantity of our aid flows is less important than their contribution to the quality of life and to the development of human societies.

If every nation which is involved in the development business is to aim at this kind of goal, it will be necessary to identify a new social measurement. We have been concentrating on economic indicators; it is now time to look for a way to measure the social dimensions of economic change. It is easy enough to make economic distinctions between the least developed countries and those which are nearer to what is often called economic take-off; but at the moment it is extremely difficult to measure the progress of each individual society on its own standards rather than those of our industrial societies.

It is, for instance, almost certainly no blessing to a developing society if we help to quicken its economic growth, but at the same time choke its rivers, contaminate its air and destroy its natural treasure. This question of environmental pollution is highly topical. **It is to be considered at a world conference on this problem in Stockholm this summer. It is not for us to dictate to developing countries what is best for them. They must be the judges of their own environmental problems, and we must avoid the temptation to assume that they are necessarily the same as our own. We have been trying for some years to bring social and ecological factors into our methods of appraising the development projects we are asked to finance.

Our aid has largely concentrated on developing the resources of land, communications and water; and on the basic requirements of good administration. In most of these fields, it is easier to measure advances in quantity than those of quality. While need is as great as it is, we must clearly continue to think about quantity. At the same time we must never forget quality.

Certainly the quality of life of many people in poorer countries has been improved by the early concentration in our Aid Programme on basic infrastructure. The development of water resources in many parts of Africa and Asia has displaced the old pattern of subsistence-living by the release of new productive energies, and has given to village life in these areas a sense of purpose. I saw this for myself last year, both in Indonesia and in the Indian Punjab.

A similar change in the condition of life is taking place in the Caribbean, particularly among smallholders growing bananas. We are trying to make a contribution towards it by helping the building of roads. A banana, like any other cash crop, is only profitable if it arrives in good condition at the point of sale; it is worth little if it has been bruised by a bumpy journey over rough going. Having travelled myself early this year on some poor West Indian roads, I became more than ever convinced that good roads mean unbruised bananas, which bring higher prices and better standards of living. It is the roads which are the key to greater prosperity.

The physical infrastructure is important; but I have been taught by my visits to Asia, Africa and the Caribbean that an improvement in the human infrastructure is even more essential to development. Trained men and women are in short supply. This is why technical assistance – the provision by Britain of people to pass on their skills – plays such a large part in our aid programme. No assessment of the contribution made by British aid could leave out of account the immensely valuable work of our people who serve abroad, whether in an advisory or a more active capacity; planning or supervising a piece of road construction; improving local crops or developing water supplies. They are themselves building up the physical infrastructure; they are also providing for the future by training people who will take over from them. The real achievement of this sort of aid is that we are steadily working ourselves out of a job.

A few years ago, for example, we were sending out every year a thousand school teachers. We now concentrate on providing experienced people to

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***The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment took place in Stockholm in June, 1972—Ed.*

help to raise the standard of teacher training. The increase in the number of trained people in the developing countries is balanced by some decline in the total number of our own people abroad. Ten years ago, 15,000 of them were serving abroad under some kind of technical assistance arrangement. There are now about 9,000, significantly including a thousand British teaching staff in overseas universities. As the numbers decline, we shall have to concentrate more on the quality of our assistance, particularly because a great deal of the world's capital investment in development will continue to depend on the high standards set by our people who are working in developing countries.

At the General Assembly of the United Nations late in 1970, the Prime Minister promised that Britain would do its best to reach by 1975 the target of at least 1 per cent of gross national product in the flow of resources to less developed countries. That flow includes both official aid and private investment. The Prime Minister did not at the same time accept the subsidiary target that seven-tenths of that 1 per cent flow should be in official aid. Britain exceeded the 1 per cent target in each of the last couple of years, mainly because of a high level of private flows towards developing countries. At the end of the 1971/72 financial year, disbursements under our Aid Programme are expected to be about £250 millions. The Government intends to increase this figure each year, so that it will rise by half as much again over the next four years. Yet, although the aid total is growing more quickly than most other public programmes, official British aid represents a percentage of GNP still just below 0.4. It is about average for all the major aid donors, but it is well short of the target of 0.7 per cent.

I have so far taken several opportunities to underline my belief that the qualitative goals of the aid programme receive too little attention, but are as important as the quantity of money we make available. This does not mean that the quantity is itself unimportant: it means precisely the opposite. I have stressed the need of genuine social improvement to deal with questions of population and unemployment, health, education and rural improvement, because all development must be measured by such progress; but in every country the need for some financial yardstick remains.

Because it tends to divert attention from criteria that are at least as important, I believe there are dangers in the present concentration on volume targetry; but national performance is undoubtedly stimulated by the existence of international machinery which examines – mainly quantitatively – the development and aid performance of each country. The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations will shortly be preparing a system of examining every two years how far member nations have gone towards the objectives laid down by the Strategy for the Second Development Decade. This will be a new piece of examination machinery.

All the sixteen major aid givers take part in a kind of group therapy session on individual performances. This is conducted through the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (often referred to as the donors' club). The committee agrees international standards for aid donors, and keeps them on their toes; but it is concerned with development looked at from a donor's point of view. It is at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (more generally known as UNCTAD) that donors and recipients discuss at length the major issues of aid, trade, and development. These Conferences take place every four years. They have become great international occasions. At the approaching† third meeting of UNCTAD, at Santiago, representatives of over 120 countries are expected to take part. Three-quarters of them will be from developing countries. The third UNCTAD will be mainly concerned with monetary problems, access to markets of goods from the poorer countries, and trade in general; but the less developed nations will doubtless be pressing the richer nations on the matter of official development assistance, the terms under which it is provided, and the uses to which it is put.

In spite of this variety of international assemblies, where the effort of the richer nations and the performance of the developing countries can be examined, the real achievements are certain to remain very hard to measure. Progress towards making the world "a better place to live in" must largely be a matter of individual judgement; but few would deny that the provision of jobs for the unemployed, the better use of natural resources and a sound administrative structure are good things in themselves. Progress towards these and other "good" objectives is painfully slow and, because economic activity continues to increase more quickly in developed economies, the gap between rich and poor grows obstinately wider.

But this is no argument against aid. The creation of a single new job; the barely perceptible movement of one poor family in Asia, Africa or Latin America a few steps away from the grinding poverty which reduces life to a mere struggle, often vain, to keep alive; the realization, through experience, that the world was created for better things than that – this is the kind of progress which justifies the help that we call aid. This progress, slow as it may be, is taking place the world over and I am in no doubt that our duty is to continue and, if possible, to quicken it.

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† *This paper was presented in the month preceding the Third UNCTAD.*—Ed.

Administrative Training in the Republic of Guinea, 1957 - 1970

By 'LADIPO ADAMOLEKUN

Mr. Adamolekun, formerly a Research Fellow at the Institute of Administration, University of Ife, Nigeria, is now at St. Antony's College, Oxford.

The Beginnings of Administrative Training, 1957-1962

Guinea, like other francophone West African countries, became initiated to the French tradition of training administrators in the early fifties. In 1957, she established the first School of Administration in francophone West Africa. Was this a reflection on the extent to which Guineans had accepted the French tradition? What was at the origin of the Guinean administrative training institution?

Like their counterparts all over francophone West Africa, Guinean leaders first tasted effective political power after the *Loi-Cadre* provisions had been translated into action in 1957. But they quickly realized that their new-found power was much circumscribed by the French *Commandants de cercle* who effectively controlled local administration and through it exercised considerable power and influence over the daily life of the people. They therefore decided to seek ways and means of checking the powers of these Commandants. The solution they found was to propose that Guineans be appointed as their deputies. It was their awareness of the low calibre of the available candidates that stimulated the introduction of a major training programme. This was the origin of the institution which was called *l'Ecole territoriale d'administration*.

The Guinean Territorial School of Administration (GETA)[1] was, therefore, a pragmatic answer to a practical problem and its founders were hardly bothered about the rationale of the French tradition they were copying – the achievement of a political objective was their overriding consideration. But this case also illustrates another important factor that later determined the setting up of similar institutions in other francophone West African countries: the absence of trained nationals to replace departing French administrators created a clear need for training institutions to produce them.

A further proof of the importance attached by Guinean leaders to the political objective they set out to achieve through GETA was their concern about the selection of candidates. Although there was a competitive examination, recruitment was largely based on political considerations and virtually all those recruited were militants of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG), the ruling party[2]. The following sentence from what was considered the best answer paper to the essay set for candidates is most revealing:

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[1] All abbreviations are given in full at the end of the article.

[2] Information based on interviews, July, 1968.

> "The African administrator's task will be facilitated because the black man, forgetting the appearance of the white coloniser who came to him as a master will open out to his brother and with him will push ahead the wheel of history."[3]

Satisfied with the candidates selected, the Guinean leaders left them to the charge of expert administrators (paradoxically, perhaps, for the most part French) who introduced them to the basic concepts of general administration and taught them specific skills like accounts, office routine and basic legal procedures.

Within a year of its establishment GETA came to an abrupt end. This was a result of the Guinean option for independence in the famous Gaullist referendum of September, 1958, which led to the withdrawal of all French administrative personnel from the country. This incident deprived GETA students of their instructors, and more interesting still, they suddenly found themselves among the most qualified administrators available in the country! In the country of the blind, they say, the one-eyed man is king. Without any formal ending to their training they were posted at once to the different *Cercles* not as deputies but as substantive Commandants[4].

In spite of the newly-established Government's multifarious and pressing duties, it was able to turn its attention to the question of administrative training as early as February, 1959, when a new *Ecole nationale d'administration* (National School of Administration)[5] was established. Like GETA before it, the GENA could only train for middle-level posts and this seemed to have been the area where the need was most pressing[6]. Entry conditions stipulated that candidates should possess the *Brevet élémentaire* (certificate obtained after three years in secondary school) and to have served for five years in the colonial administration. Another condition that was required – though not expressly stated – was that candidates had to be known supporters of the new order. The school's staff of six was made up of two Guineans who had received legal training in France at the magistrates' section of the *Ecole nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer* (ENFOM) and four foreigners, among them two French who had chosen to stay behind in Guinea because of their sympathy for the new regime. GENA's programme was more elaborate than that of its predecessor. Four sections were created: general administration, justice and police, economics and finance, and external affairs. The two classes which passed through GENA spent one year at the end of which every student was found a place in the administration depending on the section he had followed at the GENA.

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[3] *Guinée Nouvelle* (Official organ of the Guinean *Loi-Cadre* Government), 15th April, 1958. The essay question was: "How do you conceive the role of the chief of administrative post in the political, economic and social evolution of the Territory?"

[4] Some of the *anciens élèves* of GETA hold important posts in present-day Guinea in both Party and Government.

[5] The word "national" now replaces "territorial" to reflect the change in the country's status.

[6] Politicians with some basic formal education who knew the policies of the Government were appointed to the more senior posts to supplement the few available Guineans who had been trained in France.

By the end of 1960 GENA had closed down and it was not until February, 1962, that a new programme of administrative training was launched. If the few months' break in 1958-59 can be attributed to the strains and stresses caused by the precipitate withdrawal of the French from Guinea, the longer break in 1961-62 is not so easy to explain. B. Ameillon in her *La Guinée, bilan d'une indépendence*[7], has suggested that the closure of the school and the limitation of its training to middle-level manpower were motivated by the desire of the party militants who had recently obtained senior administrative posts, to keep those positions permanently and to constitute themselves into a "closed shop". While it may be correct to say that these party militants-turned-administrators would have liked to make their new appointments permanent, it is difficult to agree with Ameillon that this was the sole reason responsible for limiting training to the middle rank officials.

It can, in fact, be argued that the main reasons for the government's action are to be found in its essentially pragmatic approach to administrative training. As in 1957, the decision to set up the GENA in 1959 was to meet a specific purpose – produce accountants, law-enforcing officers, financial officers and some administrative secretaries to serve in the newly-established embassies abroad. It was not a question of a commitment *à la française* to training based on a long-established belief and practice. Finally, even if the intention was there, the men and women to train at the high level were not available – a result of French neglect of education in her West African colonies[8].

The new institution set up in February, 1962, was called the *College préparatoire d'administration* where the Government decided to continue the training of those of the middle-rank until it should be possible to start training senior officials[9]. For the first time recruitment was based strictly on academic qualifications and entrance examinations were organised in two parts: one for pupils who had already completed the first three years in secondary school and the other for those who had obtained the first part of the *baccalauréat* (approximately equivalent to anglophone "O" Level). About 300 pupils sat the examinations from whom twenty-five were accepted from each category. This proved to be the only group so recruited because the Government decided in 1963 to convert the institution into a full-fledged School of Administration – using the 1959 name (GENA) – for training senior administrators. The students recruited in 1962 were then sent to other institutions to receive appropriate training.

The Transitional Period: 1963-1965

Developments from 1963 onwards differ in two important respects from what we have been describing so far. First, high-level training was introduced and secondly, the Government began to show real consciousness about the purpose of administrative training. If high-level training came as a logical step after a certain amount of middle-level training had taken place, and was made possible because qualified students were now becoming available, Government's concern over the purpose of administrative training was dictated by two other factors. The first was the abortive attempt of the United States' Agency for International Development to establish a working relationship between GENA and Boston University, something similar to the relationship between the University of Pittsburgh and the Institute of Administration, Zaria, Nigeria[10]. Although the Boston team rendered invaluable service to GENA during their one-year stay (especially in Library development), their presence served, as later events were to show, as an eye-opener to Guinean leaders of the strategic position of an administrative training institution[11]. The second factor which is closely connected with the first, was the growing development of a revolutionary ideology in the country and by 1965 administrative training had been integrated into the national plan for revolutionary education for Guinean youth[12].

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[7] Paris: François Maspéro, 1964, p. 182.

[8] It has been estimated that only 8 per cent of the school-going age population in Guinea were in school in 1957 and of this only a handful were receiving secondary education and other forms of higher education. See S. Touré, *L'Afrique et la révolution*, Vol. 13 (Switzerland, n.d.), p. 211.

[9] Information based on interviews, July, 1968.

When GENA was established in 1963 it was planned that students would spend three years at the School but by May, 1964, the length of study was increased to four years and the name of the institution was changed to the *Ecole supérieure d'administration*[13] (GESA). In February, 1965, GESA quitted its independent site located near the heart of the town and became integrated with the Polytechnic – Guinea's principal institution of higher learning situated in the outskirts of Conakry. The last changes that took place within these first two years occurred in December, 1965, when the length of study was increased by another year, bringing the total to five. Other changes occurred in the method of recruitment of students, the internal organization of the school and its curriculum.

Since the impact of most of these changes was not felt until the beginning of the 1965/66 session the period 1963-65 can be rightly regarded as the transitional period in the development of administrative training in Guinea. It marked the beginning of high level administrative training, witnessed the short-lived stay of the Boston Team and, perhaps most important of all, it marked the beginning of a conscious government policy towards administrative training. During these two years training at GESA borrowed from both French and American approaches, especially from the former whose Law degree syllabus it copied[14].

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[10] This motive has been acknowledged by a Boston Team member, Brian Weinstein, in his "Guinea's School of Public Administration", *Journal of Local Administration Overseas*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (October, 1965), pp. 239-243.

[11] The writer has not found any documentation on the abrupt stop of the GENA-Boston relationship. Brian Weinstein, in his article cited above, was silent on the issue. GESA officials including the lady Secretary-General who held the same post at the GENA, said nothing concrete when interviewed in July, 1968. From informal discussions I gathered that the Guinean Government decided to discontinue the relationship because it feared it could result in the introduction of American ways and ideas in an institution that trained future state officials.

[12] "Revolutionary administration" dates from 1964 in Guinea. See S. Touré, *Le Pouvoir populaire*, Vol. XVI (Conakry: Imprimerie nationale "Patrice Lumumba"), p. 221.

[13] Guinea thus became the only francophone West African country to drop the consecrated title, "ENA", inherited from France.

Recruitment to GESA was through competitive entrance examinations and only candidates with the two parts of the *baccalauréat* (equivalent of anglophone "A" level) were qualified to sit the examination. Twenty students were recruited in 1963 and another seventeen in 1964. Although three fields of study were established in the school (General Administration, Economic and Financial Affairs and Judiciary, to which Police was joined in 1964/65), all students followed the same courses during the first two sessions. There was a strong legal bias as mentioned above and all subjects offered in the French Law degree course were taught. Among subjects included to provide general culture were Sociology, Philosophy, Geography, French, Economics and English.

The teaching staff in 1963/64 consisted of five French, three American, two Belgian, one Haitian and one Guinean. In 1964/65 only one American remained on the staff and the other foreigners were French and Belgian. Most of them (including the Guineans) worked at GESA on a part-time basis. A variety of training techniques was used, largely due to the presence of the Boston team. The case method was used, students were organized in study groups (*équipes de travail*), films were shown, visits were organized and in most subjects there were sessions composed of practical exercises. In addition to the use of modern administrative training techniques, periods of internship were organized for students during the summer holidays. They were sent on a training attachment of four weeks either in the administrative regions or in central ministerial departments – bearing in mind their possible future orientations. At the end of his training each student submitted a report signed by the head of his department or the governor of his region. The assessment of these reports counted in the final grading of the student.

The course at GESA was residential and French University traditions were largely followed. At the head of the administration was a Guinean lady called the Secretary-General. She was assisted in the running of the school by a *censeur*, who was the director of studies and a *surveillant général* who was in charge of day-to-day discipline. It is remarkable that even at a time when foreign influence was still considerable at GESA, the administration was completely in the hands of Guineans. This situation contrasts sharply with the practice in other francophone schools which were both directed and largely run by French personnel.

To sum up, the first three years of high level administrative training in Guinea were essentially a transitional period as shown by the numerous changes we have already enumerated. If the Boston team helped to establish a library and managed to introduce some modern administrative training techniques, Guinean approach to training was largely modelled after the

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[14] Brian Weinstein, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

French tradition during this period. It consisted of the three strands of courses that characterise administrative training in France: general culture courses, specialization courses and professional training. There was, however, another crucial dimension that was emerging during this same period – the Guinean Government became conscious of the strategic nature of its administrative training programme. This consciousness was to have profound effects on subsequent Guinean approach to administrative training. Although some traces of American and French influences remained, what emerged after 1965 deserves to be considered as a distinctively Guinean creation – the marriage between administrative training and the Guinean Revolution.

Administrative Training and the Guinean Revolution: 1965 – Present Day

While GESA's programmes after 1965 preserved the three strands characteristic of French administrative training programmes, the mixture of these programmes with the indoctrinal aspects of Guinean educational philosophy significantly modified that tradition. Although the teaching of History and Ideology of the PDG had been made compulsory in all educational institutions since the "Teachers' Plot" of 1961[15], GESA seemed to have been little touched by this order. As we have seen, it was not until the Boston team sought some form of permanent relationship with GESA that the Government's attention was drawn to the strategic position of the Institution.

The first step that was taken was to transfer GESA to the IPC[16] where it was treated as other Faculties of the institution and its students were assimilated to the IPC student body. As for its curriculum, not only did the teaching of the History and Ideology of the PDG become important, the whole structure was re-organized to fall in line with the new revolutionary educational philosophy of the country. Henceforth, GESA's role was defined within the overall national goals and objectives articulated by the Party. Because these goals are broadly the same as those identified by the Development Administration School[17] – economic, social and political development – one may be tempted to say that there is nothing new in what has happened in Guinea. There is an important difference. The Guinean administrator is guided in his actions; societal goals have been identified and defined and his whole training is designed to enable him to contribute to their achievement. This is what constitutes the new dimension to administrative training in Guinea. Aside the question of whether Administrative Science exists as a discipline, it seems plausible to argue that an administrative education in the context of a clearly defined political philosophy can, with Guinea an example, be described as scientific in its own right[18].

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[15] Official expression used to describe the clash between Sékou Touré and the Teachers' Trade Union towards the end of 1961 when students in two lycées in Conakry went on strike. This incident was marked by the expulsion of the Soviet ambassador from Guinea on the grounds that he had interfered in the matter.

[16] Abbreviation for the *Institut polytechnique de Conakry*. It became the *Institut polytechnique Gama Abdel Nasser de Conakry* in October, 1970. The old abbreviation will be preserved throughout this article.

[17] See, for example, S. M. Katz, "A Model for Educating Development Administrators", *Public Administration Review*, XXVIII, 6 (Nov./Dec., 1968), pp. 530-538.

Decree No. 402/PRG of 18th December, 1965, which set out the latest re-organization of GESA, integrated it with the IPC which is in turn attached to the Ministry of Education. Since this date GESA has remained a School (also referred to as a Faculty) of the IPC, occupying a position similar to that of individual Faculties of the institution. According to this decree, GESA's mission is to train "Administrators of all kinds" during a period of five to six years. Students trained at GESA will become members of hierarchy "B" in the Guinean Civil Service[19].

Recruitment of Students

Admission to GESA is based on the same conditions as those for entry into other Faculties of the IPC. Students with their full *baccalauréat* sit an open competitive examination and selection is based on the performance of the candidates and the number is decided upon by a National Commission where members of both the Government and GESA sit. On admission to GESA the student cannot say what section he would like to choose. This will depend on his performance in the Preliminary Year. The students who top their class at the end of that year are usually allowed to make their own choice while others are distributed "according to the needs of the Guinean Administration"[20].

We can conclude from the above that recruitment is based on objective criteria and any student who wishes can, if he qualifies, enter GESA where, like other francophone Schools of Administration, non-intellectual abilities, especially personal qualities are not judged. It may be that ideological education is considered adequate for taking care of this aspect. The democratic nature of the Guinean recruitment process needs to be emphasized and here Guinea seems to have succeeded more than other francophone countries – even including France[21]. This success has been made possible by the fact that education is free from the Primary School to the University, and this means that there is equal opportunity for all. Although the full effects of this may not be felt for several years to come, it still remains true to say that GESA is not training the children of a particular class of people.

The following table reveals some details about the students recruited to date. There has been a considerable increase in their number over the four-year period: from 20 in Fourth Year to 44 in the Preliminary Year, giving the fairly high total of 139.

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[18] The relationship between the science of administration and political theory is discussed by H. J. Storing in his essay, "The Science of Administration", published in H. J. Storing (ed.) *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (New York: Holts, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962), pp. 101-102.

[19] Unlike the arrangements in other francophone countries, the hierarchy "A" of the Guinean Civil Service is reserved for the very highly qualified few and the *Statistique du travail* published in December, 1967, showed that nobody had qualified so far.

[20] This respect for meritocracy is similar to that applied in the choice of career at the French ENA.

[21] This success can be attributed to the effort of the Guinean Government to translate the egalitarian slogan of the Revolution into reality.

TABLE I

The Guinean advanced School of Administration: Distribution of Students by year of study and by section of specialization, July, 1968

Year	Total	Public Administration and Business Management/ Economy and Finance[1]	Legal Studies
Preliminary	44	–	–
First	47[2]	34	7
Second	28	19	9
Third[3]	–	–	–
Fourth	20	13	7

Notes: (1) Although three categories are distinguished, Government decrees often merge this with Public Administration and Business Management. Teaching at GESA observes the distinction between the two. (See Appendix.)

(2) Six female students are enrolled for advanced secretarial duties.

(3) Year Two students are the first to be affected by the introduction of a Preliminary Year. This is why there are no students in Year Three.

No other francophone West African country with comparable population has as many students undergoing administrative training at the same time. This figure is, however, justifiable as the public sector in Guinea embraces much of what would fall into the private sector in most other countries.

The distribution of students reveals that legal administration is being de-emphasized; the explanation for this lies in the fact that a large part of legal administration has been entrusted to party officials whose qualification is their knowledge of party ideology. Finally, it is striking that in spite of the urgent Guinean needs to produce men to run the much expanded public sector, it can afford a training programme lasting over five years. Perhaps the Revolution does not believe in "crash" programmes. Or it may be the Government is just being realistic since the "experienced" men on the job themselves know very little that they can transmit to others by way of crash programmes.

Recruitment of Staff

The recruitment of staff has been affected by the several changes that have occurred with regard to site and length of study. Until September, 1967, administrators and technical experts drawn from various fields participated in the teaching at GESA. Their number started to decrease when the integration with the IPC commenced in 1965 and only two practitioners were on the staff in the 1967/68 session. This was the result of a corresponding increase in the number of the University component on the staff. GESA began to draw on local academic sources and the Faculty members in the Social Sciences were found very useful. In July, 1968, there were four Africans on the staff (all Africans are considered as Guineans) and some ten foreigners. Among the latter were Belgians, a French Canadian couple, one Russian who taught planning, one Rumanian and a Bulgarian who taught political economy. Students complained about the language difficulties of the East European staff and those of them (students) who were in GESA at the time practitioners constituted the majority of the staff, said they would like to see an increase in the number of staff members recruited from outside the University[22].

Curriculum, Teaching Methods and Materials

GESA's curriculum contains subjects covering the three strands that characterize French administrative training programmes. Subjects associated with general culture which are common to all sections for two years (the Preliminary Year and the First Year) include: philosophy, history, political institutions, law, sociology, modern languages and elements of mathematics. In the specialization courses there is the customary division into sections with legal studies featuring prominently in the non-juridical sections. Finally, professional training is provided for through periods of internship. Added to these features are two new dimensions dictated by the Guinean Revolution.

The first is the presence of a business perspective at GESA. Instead of a general administration section characteristic of francophone schools we have a public administration and business management section. In the socialist economy envisaged for Guinea (the term "non-capitalist" looks like a transitional terminology) the traditional distinction between public administration and business management has no place. In a sense, GESA seems to be doing what Fayol had advocated earlier on in the century, namely, that the same training be given to industrial managers and Government administrators[23].

The second new dimension introduced at GESA is the importance attached to the ideological education of students. In French tradition, courses are given on *déontologie* (sense of professional service) but ideological indoctrination is unknown[24]. At GESA, the history and ideology of the PDG are taught to all students for three years (it does not matter if the same material is repeated year after year) and some practical training of an ideological nature is also introduced: military training for all and one month manual labour every summer for three years. Finally, and to underline the importance of ideological training, a three-month post-graduate course is devoted entirely to completing the ideological education of students[25].

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[22] Information based on interviews, July, 1968. This situation may be considered a dilemma of University-based Schools of Administration. Total integration with the IPC has meant tapping internal resources before looking outside but students feel that practitioners' number should not have been drastically reduced.

[23] Henri Fayol, "The Administrative Theory of the State", in G. Luther and L. Urwick (eds.), *Papers on the Science of Administration* Institute of Public Administration, New York, (1937), p. 101.

[24] Indeed, fear of ideological indoctrination was one of the factors responsible for the long delay in the establishment of a government-sponsored institution for training general (as distinct from technical) administrators in France.

The whole programme is spread over five years (excluding the post-graduate course) the first of which is the Preliminary Year during which all students follow the same courses. In the Final Year no subjects are to be taught; the students devote the year to the writing of a paper – *mémoire de fin d'études supérieures* – which they will defend before a jury at the end of the session.

Conscious efforts are made at GESA to diversify teaching methods. One approach is the introduction of some practical element into the teaching of almost every subject – an attempt to reduce the traditional classroom lectures. Practical sessions at GESA may take any of the following forms. A student prepares a topic on which he leads a class discussion and at the end faces the questions and criticisms of his colleagues. The teacher may award marks. This can also be done on group basis. Both constitute a kind of seminar although the term is not in fact used. Visits also constitute a form of practical teaching. These can be made to state enterprises for those studying business management or to attend legal proceedings for those engaged in legal studies.

Internships constitute another important method of training at GESA. Students spend a month of their summer vacation in a government department or in one of the state enterprises. This begins in the First Year when the student already knows his particular specialization and he is accordingly posted to the appropriate department. Each student writes a report on his experience and this is signed with the comments of the Head of the service to which he has been attached. This continues until the Third Year. The posting in the Third Year is generally related to the subject of the student's Final Year. For example, a student who intends to write on "the Organization of Central Government in Guinea" is sent to the Ministry of Civil Service.

A new kind of practical training – a sort of civics education – began in 1968 and it is not known yet whether it will become permanent. This programme requires all IPC students (including GESA), except those in their final year, to spend a month of their summer vacation doing collective manual labour. It is hoped in future to start an IPC farm where this work will be done.

Perhaps the best developed teaching method at GESA is research. This was first developed by the Boston Team in the form of students' papers. Afterwards, it took the form of an end-of-course diploma *mémoire* called ***mémoire de fin d'études supérieures***, submitted by every student at the IPC in the tradition of East European Universities. In spite of the frequent changes in their programmes the first two annual classes have managed to use this method. For the subsequent classes their final year will be reserved exclusively for this exercise. Research involves the students in a critical description and evaluation of administrative practices and the marshalling of facts and ideas in a useful form – practices that constitute an asset to a modern administrator.

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[25] This post-graduate course is described in detail later on.

At the end of his Third Year, a GESA student chooses his *mémoire* subject from a list prepared by GESA Faculty members after consultation with Government Departments and State Enterprises and formal approval of the Minister of Education. The current practice is to make a Faculty member supervise a student with a senior official concerned with his research acting as a Consultant (wherever possible). Students said they have found the Consultants very helpful. Here are some topics on which papers have been written:

The Organization of Central Administration in Guinea,

Transport System in Guinea,

The Experience of State Trade Under the Three-Year Plan.

The writer looked through the papers written by the first annual class and saw a number of the second year working on their papers. There is reason to believe that the students take the work very seriously. It seems, however, that students are handicapped by the inadequacy of research materials. With the integration of GESA into the IPC in 1965, came the merging of its growing specialized library established by the Boston Team with the IPC library. Today, GESA shares the same library with other Faculties of the IPC and this means that its needs are treated like those of other IPC Faculties. Very little has been added to the pre-integration stock and students now have to supplement what is available at the IPC with materials available from the National Library and Archives.

Another closely related problem is the dearth of basic books. The problem here is enhanced by the shortage of foreign exchange. One way out may be through book gifts from Belgian and French-Canadian universities and other similar institutions. It seems that the present research orientation will help the school build up considerable local material within a short time but there will have to be some improvement in the financial position of the country before the problem of basic text books can be solved. As at present, the GESA cannot, by any standard, be regarded as a centre of information and documentation in administration.

On the whole, then, attempts are made at GESA to diversify training techniques and internship periods also include some amount of civic education. The greatest limitation appears to be financial. We have seen how this affects the library facilities and the availability of basic text books. It also affects the introduction of some other modern training techniques like the use of films and visual aids. The discontinuance of the case study method due to lack of teachers interested in it must also be regarded as unfortunate since this participatory method has now become universally accepted as an effective administrative training technique.

Grading Method and Placement

The grade of students is determined as follows. There is an examination at the end of each session which determines those who will move on to the next year[26]. The performance of students in different tests and assignments done during the session also count in this decision. Details of the grading system are set out in Decree No. 181/PRG of 5th May, 1964. An average score of 12/20 qualifies a student for promotion to the next Year. An average of 7/20 or less leads to withdrawal while those who fall between may repeat the Year if the Faculty Academic Board so decides. Order No. 802/DGSI of 7th May, 1965, completes the provisions of the decree by stipulating that students who are rejected at GESA are to be "oriented towards other sectors of Guinean Administration".

The final grading is done in two stages. The first consists of the grading of the paper written by students. The jury that sits over this is named by a ministerial order and consists of Faculty members, the Director General of the IPC and a senior administrator from the Guinean civil service. The student defends his paper before the jury and may be awarded any of the following grades: excellent, meritorious, acceptable and inadequate. A student whose paper is judged "inadequate" automatically fails to qualify for a certificate and does not proceed to the next stage. He must have another go at the paper[27]. For those who have successfully jumped the first hurdle their final grading is based on their average for the previous three years. The final grading is classified as follows: special distinction, distinction and pass. To qualify for "special distinction" a student must obtain an average of 80 per cent in his cumulative average and an "excellent" in his paper. An "excellent" in the paper with a cumulative average of not less than 60 per cent qualifies a student for the "distinction" grade. In the results of the first intake – the "Lenin" Class – there was one special distinction, five distinctions and five passes.

Like other francophone countries, the posting of GESA students does not follow the consecrated French tradition of making students choose their career according to their position in the final grading. In fact, the posting decision in Guinea still has to await the result of another three-month post-graduate course in ideological education. The performance of each student in that training determines the importance of the post to be assigned to him. Those who fail will not qualify for employment[28]! It is the *Bureau Politique National* (BPN) of the ruling PDG that assigns posts to students.

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[26] Table 1 shows that the first intake had nine casualties and if the first set failures were all allowed to repeat, it means that the second intake had six – a fairly high rate.

[27] The only student whose paper was considered "inadequate" among the first set was given four months during which to make amends. For subsequent sets it will mean spending another year.

[28] It is unlikely that any student will fail at this stage. And in case any student fails, the system which shows concern for earlier drop-outs is likely to do something for such a student.

Internal Structure of the School

Since its integration with the IPC in 1965 GESA has been under the same administrative rule as the other Faculties of the IPC. Before examining this administrative set-up let us briefly consider the reasons for the integration. The official reason given in February, 1965, when the GESA quitted its independent site in the town was that the Government desired to integrate all institutions of higher learning in one place to ensure uniformity[29]. A reason not publicized was to avoid departmental demands for their own institutions which GESA being attached to the Ministry of Civil Service, had stimulated.

The integration decision also responded to important economic and political considerations. In terms of staff, personnel and materials, separate premises for GESA would obviously cost a lot more than integrated status within the IPC. The political motivation was perhaps the most compelling reason and this perhaps is what the Government meant by its reference to "uniformity"[30]. It was invidious and the cause of jealousy that GESA students should have enjoyed more liberal treatment than their IPC colleagues who were subjected to military discipline. This separate treatment for a section of the country's youth was considered politically dangerous – a country in search of national integration should not promote a division of its youth[31]. The obvious solution of course was that all students should be given equal treatment and it was found that integration provided the surest means of achieving this objective.

Let us now examine the administrative set-up at the IPC with special reference to GESA. At the head is an Administrator General who has overall responsibility for the running of the institution. There is a military man, the *Officier d'Etat Major*, who is charged with responsibility for internal discipline. A director of studies is responsible for the scheme of work in all Faculties and Schools. Day-to-day administration of GESA is the responsibility of an administrative secretary[32]. There is also a University Council consisting of the Deans of the different Faculties and Schools.

The decision to make a soldier responsible for discipline at the IPC may sound strange to those accustomed to an Anglo-Saxon conception of university life. The Guinean action seems to have been dictated by a realisation of French student life which is characterized by a high degree of "direct action" expressed through strikes which often become violent. This tradition has spread to all francophone countries and has taken on the additional form of intergenerational conflict in a new State. Two *lycées* were on strike in Guinea in 1961 and in 1962 when the IPC was founded it was decided to place it under military discipline to forestall such strikes. In practice the desired objective seems to have been achieved. As it turned out, the officer became a sort of students' affairs official with whom the students' executive committee consulted. By 1966 the political leadership decided to make military training compulsory for all young Guineans and the *Officier d'Etat Major* was charged with this new responsibility. Since then, each student undergoes an hour of military training each week. For future administrators this is regarded as a useful form of moral training through which they can imbibe the sense of discipline, obedience, and patriotism – qualities that no formal teaching can adequately inculcate into students.

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[29] The nature of this uniformity was not specified.

[30] This view was confirmed during interviews with GESA students in July, 1968.

[31] In Senegal, for example, the post-graduate nature of the course helps to justify different treatment for students of the country's School of Administration although the lack of funds has made it difficult to build separate premises. In the Ivory Coast, courses are non-residential and therefore no problem of this nature arises.

[32] The current Administrative Secretary was the Secretary General of the GENA during the transitional period.

GESA students share campus life with their colleagues in other Faculties. Two of them were on the students' Executive Committee for the 1967/68 session. This effort to mix the students in their undergraduate days is seen as a means of encouraging future collaboration and co-operation in the national interest. GESA students join the diverse clubs and associations open to all those on the IPC campus.

Post-graduate Training

There is compulsory three-month post-graduate political training for GESA students, which they undergo at the Party school side by side with other Guineans who have successfully completed their formal academic courses at the IPC and in overseas institutions. Justification has been advanced for this training on two grounds: first, it is argued that any citizen who will be called upon to serve in Guinea must be a convinced militant of the ruling party. He must possess a deep knowledge of the party ideolgy because this party incarnates the destiny of the people he intends to serve. The second argument is that the stage reached by the Guinean Revolution demands that all cadres in the country must be polyvalent; thus, students who have received advanced education in administration must also possess equivalent political education. It is only after the successful completion of the course at the Party school that students are qualified to take up appointments[34].

The training at the Party school follows roughly the same pattern as that at the GESA. It is divided into two parts: theory and practical. The theoretical part of the training takes place first. This consists of a series of lectures given by the seven members of the *Bureau Politique National* (BPN) who constitute the teaching staff of the School. These lectures cover the various aspects of Guinean life – political, administrative, economic, social and cultural. The director of the School who is in charge of the day-to-day activities of the students acts as a kind of tutorial master. He follows each series of lectures with small group discussions to ensure that students fully understand what has been said. Groups not individuals are awarded marks for post-lecture discussions.

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[34] Except for the two top students in the academic results at the GESA who went abroad for further specialist training, no GESA student was given any post until the completion of the political training in July, 1968. This training will not be compulsory for other African students who may come to the GESA.

The practical part of the training is in three stages[35]. First the students are sent to party base committees in the villages or suburbs to observe the Party in action. On their return they are asked to write a critical report on the party offices visited and to make suggestions for the improvement of their working. In the second stage, the students are sent to various party organizations to address them. The organizations visited send back a report on the performance of each student and award marks. In the third and final stage the students are sent into government departments, state enterprises and other governmental institutions in accordance with the probable area of each student's future employment. The heads of the departments and institutions write reports on the students' performance with particular reference to their public relations.

The training is rounded up by asking each student to write a thirty-line criticism of the Party. The quality of the criticism is assessed by the contribution it can make to the Party's growth.

Conclusion

Because only one class has so far completed a full GESA course, it is impossible to measure its impact on the Guinean administration. Members of this one class assumed duties in July, 1968, and the only thing that can be said is that they were all offered challenging jobs. All of them (except the two who went for further specialist training abroad) were posted to key posts in State enterprises which had hitherto suffered from mismanagement.

1970 Postscript

The foregoing account of the development of administrative training in Guinea is part of the dissertation submitted by the writer for the degree of Master of Philosophy at the Institute of Administration, University of Ife, in February, 1970[36]. A return visit to Guinea late in 1970[37] has made it possible to up-date the material used.

In this postscript we shall discuss the changes that have occurred since 1968 using the different heads adopted in the account of the post-1965 period as far as possible.

Recruitment of Students

The method of recruitment has remained largely unchanged. The only reform that has taken place is that students are now recruited directly to the First Year instead of to a Preliminary Year as in 1968. This follows Secondary

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[35] No strict order is implied.

[36] Lapido Adamolekun, "Administrative Science in Francophone Africa", unpublished M.Phil. Dissertation . . .

[37] The writer is grateful to the Rockefeller Foundation which financed this study visit.

School reforms which enable students to decide on what sections they would follow when making their applications. However, the length of study remains unchanged.

The following table of student population at GESA for the 1970/71 academic year reveals a considerable increase in the number of students, a remarkable rise of about 225 per cent. This reflects the continued expansion of the public sector in Guinea. The number of State enterprises and societies has risen from about 50 in the early sixties to over 125 by 1970. The proof that the mission of GESA is now largely dictated by the needs of these enterprises for trained manpower is that nearly 70 per cent of the students are specializing in economics/finance and accounting.

TABLE 2

The Guinean Advanced School of Administration: Distribution of Students by year of study and by section of specialization, December, 1970

Year		Total	Economy/ Finance	Legal Studies	Accounting	Police/ Securtity
First Year	..	83	19	26	38	—
Second Year	..	66	17	18	31	—
Third Year	..	51	36	15	—	—
Fourth Year	..	51	35	16	—	—
Fifth Year	..	43	28	5	—	10
TOTAL	..	294	135	80	69	10

The sex distribution of GESA students has changed slightly. The number of female students has increased from less than 10 in 1968 (about 8 per cent) to 45 in 1970 (about 15 per cent). Finally, there are now five foreign students at GESA, where there were none before. They are from Burundi, Cameroun, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Mali.

Recruitment of Staff

The preponderance of IPC faculty members on the GESA staff noted in the post-1965 period has been reversed since 1968. This is due to the fact that the Social Science Faculty which provided most of the staff at the time lost many of its members following the government decision in 1969 not to renew the contracts of almost all the foreign element on the staff. They were accused of meddling in the internal affairs of the country[38]. The result is that today both the Social Science Faculty and especially the GESA now depend on senior civil servants for most of their courses. Out of a staff of about 30 members at the GESA, only three are foreigners – two Belgians and one Egyptian – who teach law, business administration and statistics. The rest are Guineans, most of whom are civil servants who teach part-time, including the Dean of the School who is substantively employed as the President of the Guinean Court of Appeal[39].

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[38] The writer gathered from informal discussions that there was concern in Party circles about the activities of Sociology and Psychology teachers at the IPC. Both subjects were absent from the curriculum of the Institute for the 1970-71 session.

[39] Officials of the Guinean Judiciary became civil servants in 1960.

Although GESA students will derive some benefit from being taught by practitioners, the shortage of University-based staff has created difficulties. It is not uncommon to find some practitioners absent from their classes for several consecutive weeks. Besides, student-faculty dialogue becomes very limited as most of the teachers have to rush from classroom to classroom. It does appear that the present arrangement is purely a temporary expedient to tide GESA (and the Social Science Faculty) over the critical period following the massive departure of expatriate staff.

Curriculum, Teaching Methods and Materials

The curriculum has changed slightly to reflect the new emphasis on economics, finance and accounting with programmes dominated by courses on, or related to, business management, banking, accounting, planning and statistics. Courses common to all study sections cover political sociology, political economy and African institutions. Three other subjects occupy privileged positions in the programmes of all sections during the four years of formal teaching: ideology, national languages and English. The justification for the teaching of ideology is the same as before. English has become the only foreign language taught at GESA and this decision reflects the government's desire to facilitate intra-African communication for Guinean administrators. Finally, the introduction of national languages (each student is expected to learn one national language in addition to his mother tongue) came with the cultural revolution phase of the Guinean Revolution[40].

The approach to professional training has not changed. The manual labour aspect has been re-organized. It now takes place both during the School semesters (the academic year is divided into two semesters of five months each) and during the holidays. During school semesters, GESA students join others in the IPC in cleaning the premises of the Institute and during holidays they spend part of their manual labour period on the Polytechnic farm and part with farmers grouped under Local Revolutionary Authorities, the Party's basic organization for animating the activities of the rural areas. This increased involvement of GESA students in manual labour activities reflects the new title of the Polytechnic of which it forms part: a Centre of Revolutionary Education (CER). The objective of the regime is to produce administrators who will not be alienated from the people. Whatever the ultimate practical results, this approach appears imaginative and highly original.

There has been no marked improvement with regards to the books and other materials put at the disposal of the students. It seems that this unfortunate situation will persist for as long as the currency problem of the government remains unresolved. However, the *mémoires* of ex-graduates of the School now constitute a fairly rich source of documentation.

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[40] A cultural revolution was launched in Guinea in 1967, obviously inspired by the Chinese cultural revolution launched the previous year. One of the main features of the Guinean cultural revolution is the intensive literacy campaign that accompanies it. Although eight languages are officially declared national, only three are widely spoken and learned – Fula, malinka and soussou. The UNESCO is assisting the Guinean government in the programme.

Grading Method and Placement

The grading system at the GESA remains unchanged. With regard to departmental postings, an important decision was taken in 1969 when the party militancy yardstick for civil servants was "academicized". Since then, GESA students and any others who wish to enter the hierarchy "B" of the Guinean civil service (roughly equivalent to the administrative class in anglophone terminology) must pass the examination on ideology organized annually by the Party School[41]. The total number of GESA graduates now employed in the Guinean administration is 56. As before, their posting and career prospects depend on the BPN. Of course, enquiry is made as to the needs of the various branches of the administration, but decisions on postings rest with the BPN[42]. In December, 1970, most of the graduates were employed in State enterprises and the others were either in departments of central ministries or in their external services.

Internal Structure of the School

As an integral part of the IPC, GESA has been affected by all the internal re-organization measures that have taken place at the Institute since the 1968/69 session. In October, 1968, the IPC, like other educational institutions in Guinea, became a Centre of Revolutionary Education (CER). At the same time, it was decided that each CER should be administered by a Council of Administration whose President is the head of the CER while the other members, from the Vice-President downwards, are students or pupils of the institution. The Vice-President has special powers enabling him in some way to check on the President, and the other members of the council have their own specific tasks. It is the Council that is responsible for the general well-being of the institution and has responsibility to ensure that academic programmes are satisfactory. The Vice-President of the IPC Council for the 1970/71 session is a member of GESA and three other students of the School are on the council (which remains in office for nine months). Another new institution at the IPC is the *Etat Major*, which is responsible for the defence of the Revolution on the campus. It depends on the Council but its military head, the *Officier Major*, is directly under the authority of the Secretary of State for the Popular Army. GESA students also play an important part in this organization. Finally, there is a unit of the Popular Militia on the IPC campus. It assists the *Etat Major* in the defence of the Revolution and its activities are also supervised by the *Officier Major*. GESA students also participate actively within the militia.

Post-Graduate Training

The post-graduate training programme is, as before, devoted to ideological education. However, the programme followed by the first year's (Lenin) class has been discontinued and a new and shorter programme introduced instead. This began in 1969 and consists of an ideological seminar for all graduates from higher education institutions both at home and abroad, as well as certain administrative and political officials.

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[41] This decision came into effect from 1st October, 1969. See *Journal officiel de la République de Guinée*, 15th February, 1970.

[42] Personnel management in Guinea was the responsibility of the Secretariat of State for Public Service and Labour until 1969 when the affairs of the officials of hierarchies "A" and "B" were transferred to the Presidency. This decision was probably taken to facilitate BPN control on top officials.

The Secretary of State for Ideology who is also the director of the Party School, is in charge of the seminar. The teaching staff, formerly made up exclusively of BPN members, now includes a few leading members of the government. The programme of the seminar consists of a series of lectures covering the history of the PDG and all aspects of national life. These seminars last for between five and eight weeks and at the end there is a written examination. As we have already said, only successful candidates qualify for appointments in State services.

So far, there have been no cases of complete failure although the number of candidates who have had to repeat examinations has been fairly high. In the Ho Chi Minh class of 1969, 17 of the 135 candidates repeated the examinations; and in the Ernesto Che Guevara class of 1970, 40 of the 154 candidates were waiting to repeat the examinations in 1971. No GESA student has failed his ideology examination.

Finally, it was decided in October, 1970, that successful candidates would, as from 1971, spend one month (three months for graduates from foreign institutions) with Local Revolutionary Authorities (that is, among the rural masses) before assuming duty in their respective departments. This represents the practical aspect of the ideological seminar.

General Conclusions

Throughout this study we have tried to show how administrative training in the Republic of Guinea has been consistently dictated by the practical needs of the ruling regime rather than by any *a priori* commitment to the idea of administrative training. We have also emphasized how the political philosophy of the regime has profoundly influenced both the content and methods of training. What emerges clearly from the Guinean experience of administrative training is that while GESA programmes share certain similarities with training programmes in other countries – both developed and developing – especially the emphasis placed on business management, accounting, planning and statistics, the political philosophy of the ruling regime has dictated the presence of certain elements of the programmes that are not found elsewhere.

As a result of the GESA training programme, the acute shortage of qualified staff in the Guinea public service has been significantly relieved. Of course, supply is still far behind demand because of the considerable expansion of public sector activities. However, as we have already noted, GESA has also increased the size of its annual intake so as to cope with this demand.

On the other hand, the effectiveness of GESA graduates on their jobs is likely to be compromised by the fact that their posting and career prospects depend to a great extent on the BPN[43]. This problem is likely to become aggravated when more GESA graduates are recruited into the public services and it becomes impossible to find satisfactory jobs for all graduates. Since every graduate will have been declared ideologically fit, BPN may face embarrassment in accounting for its decisions. A way out may be to allow graduates to choose jobs from a prepared list, according to the order of merit established after the post-graduate ideological seminar. In any case, it appears that President Sékou Touré is already aware of this kind of problem, as his words indicate when he made the closing address to the successful candidates of the Che Guevara class in September, 1970, "No country has led a revolutionary movement without having the worst difficulties from the side of the intellectual wing of the parties . . ."[44] It will be interesting to watch how he seeks to solve this intellectual problem within the public service.

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[43] This conclusion is based on the views expressed by a few GESA graduates we interviewed in December, 1970.

[44] Published in *Horoya-hebdo*, 14th-20th November, 1970.

ABBREVIATIONS

BPN	Bureau Politique National
CER	Centre of Revolutionary Education
GENA	Ecole Nationale d'administration de Guinée
GESA	Ecole Supérieure d'administration de Guinée
GETA	Ecole Territoriale d'administration de Guinée
IPC	Institut Polytechnique de Conakry
PDG	Parti Démocratique de Guinée

Training Senior Administrators for Independence in Fiji

By A. R. HOYLE

Mr. Hoyle is on the staff of the College of Advanced Education, Canberra.

THE last decade has seen the arrival of numerous new nation states on the world scene, and today there are very few dependent territories and colonies of significant size. Among the most recent is the Dominion of Fiji which after 96 years of British rule attained independence on 10th October, 1970.

Those who were familiar with the South Pacific only a decade ago could hardly conceive that Fiji could successfully make the transition to independence so quickly and so easily because in 1960 it was a crown colony with almost all senior level government posts in the hands of expatriate colonial officials. The racial composition of the population – with the Indians the largest group and the economy firmly in the hands of the European and Indian communities – greatly muted any demand for independence on the part of the Fijians. Educational development left much to be desired, and as the great majority of the secondary school population was Indian there were few Fijians who had the educational qualifications to enter the higher ranks of the civil service of the colony.

Events in Africa and Asia in the 1950s apparently did little to instil any sense of urgency into the colonial government and little effective effort was made to prepare the indigenous population by training and development of attitudes for the traumatic change to independence.

However, the pace of constitutional change gradually accelerated and in 1966 a measure of self-government was given to the colony with many of the responsibilities of the Governor being delegated to a Council of Ministers. But there was still little feeling of urgency and few people saw beyond some apparently distant time when the colony would have full internal self-government. So training and the localisation programme proceeded at a leisurely pace. But, as is so often the case, the time scale for independence suddenly shortened in a dramatic fashion and by the middle of 1969, following agreement between the political parties and the United Kingdom government, it was considered that full internal self-government would most likely come about the middle of 1971.

Role of the University

As part of the necessary programme of development and preparation for nationhood, in 1968 the United Kingdom government established the University of the South Pacific in Suva as a regional university to cover an area from the Solomons to Western Samoa, and the New Hebrides to the Gilbert and Ellis Islands.

It was early envisaged that the University of the South Pacific would play a very important role in training the technical and administrative élites of the various countries of the South Pacific but, by the middle of 1969, it was considered that a more precise definition of the role of the University should be attempted, particularly in the field of administrative training. Accordingly, in the middle of 1969, the Vice Chancellor designate of the U.S.P., Dr. C. C. Aikman, invited Dr. S. S. Richardson, Principal of the Canberra College of Advanced Education and formerly Vice Chancellor of the University of Mauritius, to visit Fiji, Western Samoa, and Tonga, and investigate the actual role which existed for the University in the administrative training field in the South Pacific.

In October, 1969, Dr. Richardson submitted a comprehensive report with some sixteen recommendations. His report clearly indicated that the University had an important role to play, both immediately and in the long term. Of particular interest were his recommendations that, in view of the approach of independence, the University should establish an administrative training programme, and that a "crash" course of about nine months' duration should be included for experienced civil servants in Fiji and the region who had been selected for rapid advancement to senior administrative positions under the civil service localization programme.

Goals of the Training Programme

As so often happens even the abbreviated time scale proved too long and, following agreement between the major political parties in Fiji, and the success of the London Conference on constitutional development in October, 1969, it was decided that Fiji should attain, not internal self-government, but independence on 10th October, 1970. In this situation it was imperative that the senior indigenous civil servants in the colony should receive some high level training. In general these officers had better qualifications and experience than their counterparts in the neighbouring countries and territories, and it was felt that the best results would be obtained by conducting a special "crash" course for them. Because they occupied senior posts it was considered that the maximum time for which they could be released was ten weeks.

The then Chief Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara (now Prime Minister), who all along had been a keen supporter of the idea of administrative training for the civil service, was determined that some form of administrative training should still be given to senior indigenous civil servants, and following discussions with the University of the South Pacific and Dr. Richardson, a much shorter course of some ten weeks' duration was devised. Despite the fact that the course was only one-third as long as originally envisaged, the goal to prepare local officers for the senior administrative posts in the government remained the same, and the problem then became how to achieve this in the most efficient manner.

While the goal of the course was accepted on all sides, in practice it needed to be broken down into a more detailed agreement on the necessary outputs from the training exercise. As Fiji is a multi-racial society (with all the problems inherent in that description) the outputs were determined by the government and the University as being not only to produce technically well trained administrators, but also to produce administrators who clearly saw their role as builders of a new nation, as "moulders of important new policies"[1] and as the basic structural framework of government. It was also clearly determined that in the dynamic situation in which the country found itself, the administrators who emerged from the course must be adapted to the totally new political situation in Fiji, and must completely accept the need for a much larger degree of innovation than they had been accustomed to in the past.

To achieve the necessary results in the brief time available it was necessary to limit the number of students and to make a rigorous selection of those who were likely to achieve the best results. Finally, some eighteen civil servants and one university lecturer were selected to attend the course. They ranged in age from 30 to 55 years and had experience in government ranging from 0 to 35 years. Not only were Fijians and Indians represented, but also members of the Rotuman, Chinese, part European and European communities. Thirteen of the participants had tertiary qualifications ranging from a pass degree to a Ph.D., while three others were professionally qualified in their own particular fields.

Support by the Government and University

It was realised at an early stage that the course could not be successful without the backing of the highest powers in the government, and the Prime Minister (then Chief Minister) made a special point of his personal interest and that of the government in the course of the debate in the Legislative Council over the provision of the necessary finance. The government also provided a full-time Liaison Officer in the person of one of the most experienced District Commissioners with both field and secretariat experience. The University, on its part, was determined that the course should be a success and that it should be made obvious to all that the University could, and would, contribute to the fullest possible extent in the development of an administrative élite in Fiji. The Vice Chancellor personally gave every support to those concerned with the organization and running of the course and assured the fullest amount of assistance from his limited staff resources.

A course of this nature is necessarily a pacesetter and, if it is to be a success, requires a great deal of preparation by qualified and dedicated people. The New Zealand Government made a large contribution by providing an experienced officer from its Department of Civil Aviation for a period of almost a year. He and the Government Liaison Officer spent a very busy, and at times frantic, period in not only arranging the details of the programmes, the speakers, devising panels and persuading some reluctant participants, but also in urging on workmen to complete the building conversions at the University, ordering an extensive library of administrative texts and even arranging the lunches which the participants had together each day.

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[1] Speech by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara at opening of course.

Because academic staff with the requisite practical background were unavailable at that time in Fiji, arrangements were made through Dr. Richardson for the services of a Senior Lecturer in Administration from the Canberra College of Advanced Education to go to Suva as Director of Studies and principal lecturer. The Director of Studies was further supported by an experienced tutor from the Department of Government at the University of Queensland who had worked in private industry in North America and had spent some time studying development administration in the United Kingdom, and by a Senior Lecturer in Law from Victoria University, Wellington.

That so many of the topics were considered relevant by the participants was due in no small measure to the suggestions made by Mr. Ian Nicholson, who had had a long and distinguished career in Nigeria, and Mr. N. Angus, of the New Zealand State Services Commission, who had experience of administrative training in Asia.

Programme Constraints

The main constraint governing the actual programme of studies was the maximum available time of only 10 weeks. Into this period had to be packed the maximum amount of instruction together with a very large amount of individual and group work, and yet at the same time it was of crucial importance to maintain the interest and enthusiasm of the participants.

Owing to the facts that most of the participants had been away from study for a very considerable length of time and the course was running into the hot months of the year, it was felt that, if the participants worked, as they were expected, from 8 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. each day, and then went home to do some reading and individual work, this would be all that could be expected of them. Actual experience showed that this decision was correct, and longer hours would not only have been largely non-productive but might well have resulted also in rebellion on the part of some of the wives!

Topics Covered

A very wide range of topics was covered (for details see appendix) ranging from human behaviour to problems of urbanization and land tenure, and there was a consistent plan of attack which was based on the fact that a senior administrator in a developing country has a much wider range of responsibilities than his counterpart in a developed country. It was recognized that he must be aware of the new constitutional framework of Fiji, that he must fully understand the new role of the independent parliament and his responsibilities to his minister, that he must be a fully-competent manager, that he has a very real responsibility for planning and development, that his links with the community must be much closer than in colonial times, that he must be fully aware of the dynamic situation in which Fiji finds itself, and that he should quickly become accustomed to working together informally as well as formally with other members of the administrative élite of the Dominion.

Training Methods

In an attempt to achieve these ends a wide diversity of training methods was used. There were, of course, some lectures (often given by very distinguished people in the community ranging from the Governor down), as well as by the directing staff, but these were outnumbered by a large number of panel discussions which brought the participants into face-to-face confrontation with leading members of the political and business communities, and local government, labour and social welfare communities. All lectures were normally followed by discussions, and generally led to individual and group tasks which varied in length from two up to some twenty hours spread over a number of days.

The whole aim of the training methods used was to involve the participants completely, so that they were not merely passive listeners, by bringing them face-to-face with the community members (especially in the panel discussions) and to show them clearly the great responsibility which they had for the future development of their country. There is no doubt that, especially in the panel discussions, the learning was two-way, and many panel members learned more than the participants, particularly as at many times the exchange of views was almost brutally frank.

Problems

Many problems were encountered, not the least of which of course, was that the time was far too short to cover many subjects in adequate depth, and both lecturers and participants were rather frustrated.

For example, land tenure problems and district administration, although they occupied several hours, could well have occupied several days, as each is in many ways basic to the future well-being of Fiji. The second problem – which had been recognized before the course began – was that it is extremely difficult to keep senior civil servants completely uninvolved with the daily work of their offices, especially as well-trained staff are in very short supply and the course was held in close proximity to their place of work. In the event it was never possible for participants to avoid altogether being involved in day-to-day problems, and probably several averaged some one or two hours a day sitting in their offices after a hard day's work at the University.

As Fiji is a comparatively small country, considerable difficulty was encountered at times in securing speakers who were not only knowledgeable on their subject, but also adept at "putting it across" to the participants. Also some members of the community were hesitant about participating, but in this regard the course was considerably helped by the fact that it was well known throughout the community that the Prime Minister was particularly interested.

To recommence studying after some years is always difficult, and as, as previously indicated, some of the participants had been away from study for many years, there was the problem, initially, of teaching them how to listen and how to learn, but after the first week this was overcome and the major problem which developed was that of keeping up interest under the severe work pressure that went on week after week. If time had been longer, participants would have been given an occasional week-end away from the course, but as time was precious the only real break came at the time of independence in October when there was a four-day public holiday. The arrival of this holiday was a very welcome relief to the participants but it was also a stimulant because, from then on, they were well aware that there was no going back and that the responsibility for putting into practice what they were studying, lay entirely in their hands.

Evaluation

Was the course a success? As is usual in training courses, it has been extremely difficult to know how successful this exercise was, but the general consensus of opinion among the participants was that, although originally many of them were cynical about the course, they had, in fact, learned a great deal not only of techniques of administration, but also of the role the community expected them to play in independent Fiji. Furthermore, the course had, in their opinion, been invaluable in building up a sense of community among the leading civil servants and in facilitating that informal system of working without which government can only limp along.

As some months have now gone by since the completion of the course, a truer assessment might be expected. Recently an informal survey by the Director of Studies showed that the valuable attitudes that some members had developed towards the course in particular, and administrative training in general, were still with them, and that they were among the most vocal advocates of both the University and Government continuing to develop administrative training at all levels.

The Future of Administrative Training

Obviously, if proper results are to be obtained, this course cannot be left as an isolated unit even though, naturally, it will not be possible again to get together for ten weeks the most senior officers of government departments. Recognizing this, both the Government of Fiji and the University of the South Pacific have worked towards building a long-term programme and it is expected that the University will, in the middle of 1971, commence a series of training courses of six to thirteen weeks' duration for senior officers of the Government of Fiji and of the other governments in the region. It is also hoped that a long-term course of nine months' duration will commence in the near future for more junior officers who can be given the time for training denied to their seniors.

The special course for senior administrators was a rewarding and possibly unique experience, but that it should have been necessary is a reflection of the fact that independence always comes sooner than expected and that governments are rarely, if ever, properly seized of how little time there is to prepare people for the extremely difficult role of an administrator in a developing country. Administrative training is vitally important and it is only by proper planning and development that such a "crash" course as was necessary in Fiji can be avoided.

APPENDIX

Senior Administrators Course – List of Topics

Human Behaviour

Constitutional Framework of Fiji

Administrative Law

Parliamentary Government:
- Parliament and the Civil Service
- The role of the opposition
- Parliamentary procedure
- Public Accounts Committee
- Cabinet government
- The minister and the secretary
- Politics and civil servants

The role of the Administrator:
- The administrator as a manager
- Personnel management in the civil service
- Financial management
- Training and recruitment
- Industrial relations
- Organizations and pressure groups
- The administrator and national development
- The administration and the individual citizen

Problems of developing countries:
- Problems of the newly independent state
- Land tenure
- District administration
- Urbanization
- International aid
- The challenge to the establishment
- The role of the military

Fiji and the Commonwealth

Fiji as a Pacific regional centre

Fiji and the developed world

Contemporary world problems

The future of the civil service in Fiji

Bottlenecks in the African Labour Situation in Zambia

By PATRICK O. OHADIKE*

Dr. Ohadike is now employed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa as Head of the Fertility and Population Policy Section. He was previously a Research Fellow in Demography at the University of Zambia.

Introduction

There is no dearth of piecemeal and very scattered information on the labour and employment conditions of Zambian Africans. The big lacuna in this respect is the unavailability of data covering the entire country for many years back. Moreover, there is the important fact that the usefulness of the available statistics for definitional purposes is greatly hampered by deficiencies in the method of collection and by socio-economic conditions operating not only in Zambia but in other developing countries. Thus, in the absence of a compulsory registration system, the record of employment and unemployment is often inadequate and is not, therefore, a reliable barometer of the actual level of economic activity.

In the case of Zambia, data from the Employment Exchange, published in the Annual Reports of the Department of Labour, show very marked fluctuations that are often difficult to piece together for a trend analysis or for a reconciliation between their various parts. One aspect of the inconsistency from the 1960/68 reports is shown by the relationship between the annual number of registered job seekers and the number of those engaged to fill notified vacancies. In another vein, the statistics may not be a record of persons actually out of employment and actively seeking work. The point is that use of this traditional concept of unemployment in Zambia and other developing countries is, *inter alia*, affected by the fluctuating inflow of people from the rural areas to the towns. The flow tends to rise during the off-seasons for farming activities, for instance after harvesting, when some of those not fully dependent in the past on wage employment may choose to look for jobs. This then is a case where seasonal unemployment in the rural sector inflates the number of registered unemployed persons seeking work.

In fact, whether the unemployment figures reflect the actual situation in Zambia is rendered the less likely by the fact that for many years, there were a number of manual jobs which were not acceptable to many of the registered unemployed persons[1]. With little financial incentive and relatively poor living conditions, these jobs, notably farm labour on commercial farms, failed to attract unskilled job seekers who, according to official reports, constitute the bulk of the known unemployed. For instance, figures for 1961 and 1962 (Annual Labour Report, 1962, p. 47) show respectively that 41.8 per cent and 47 per cent of the registered unemployed were labourers and domestic servants, and this could be demonstrated for other years also. Thus, in the past and even presently, serious unemployment in Zambia has not been common among those with relatively high academic qualifications or recognized professional and technical skills. The prevalence of unemployment among the unskilled partly reflects the rising aspirations of many primary school leavers in this group, some of whom are either too young to be employed by the majority of employers or have developed a liking for white-collar jobs and, rather than be employed in manual positions, would prefer to be unemployed[2].

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*In view of his present position, the author wishes to state that the views expressed in this article are entirely his own and not those of the Economic Commission for Africa.

[1] See Annual Report of the Department of Labour, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1961, p. 3; 1962, p. 2; 1963, p. 2; 1966, p. 2; 1968, p. 3.

If anything, these comments only highlight the poor state of our statistics on the labour and employment levels and patterns in Zambia. It is for this reason that this paper will concentrate on indicating some labour problems and policies in Zambia, with emphasis on those associated with her socio-historical and demographic experience.

Socio-Historical Problems

The labour problems confronting Zambia's economic growth have demographic, socio-economic and historical origins. In fact, the historical influences are very obvious to all observers, and therefore demand only a brief reference here. The most readily perceived link with the past is the gap in employment and income distribution as between expatriates and Zambian highly skilled workers on the one hand, and a large number of unskilled and low paid workers (mostly Zambian) on the other. This form of dualism, in the years before independence, when very few, if any, Zambians were highly skilled, was an all pervasive aspect of social organization with the result that, up to relatively recent times, Africans in industrial employment were not given the scope to acquire skills through training. Even where they were given the opportunity of training, they got little scope for exercising the skills they had learnt and they were often not adequately compensated.

The history of the mining industry, which clearly dominates Zambia's economy, points clearly to the fact that because many Africans were ill-equipped to undertake the sophisticated processes of modern industrial technology, they were reduced to performing the most rudimentary functions. "Almost all skilled labour and much of the semi-skilled labour employed then in the industry was European[3]". Although there were apprenticeship programmes for Europeans[4], nothing of the sort in the period existed for Africans. In general, the development of African education in this period was rudimentary as a result of colonial government apathy. Moreover, there were no African trade unions before 1949. It is therefore not surprising that the Africans lacked bargaining power in the determination of the price of their labour.

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[2] *op cit;* 1961, p. 3; 1962, p. 2; 1963, pp.2-3; 1966, p. 3.

[3] Baldwin, R. E., *Economic Development and Export Growth: A Study of Northern Rhodesia*, 1920-1960, p. 42, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966.

[4] Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, *Year Books*, 1955-1962, Rhodesian Printers.

Table 1 shows the extent to which the dual employment structure still persists in occupational placement. Obviously, the differences shown are related to Zambia's past labour and educational experience, for it can be seen that the outstanding occupations with a marked low rate of participation by Zambians are mostly the professions which require long periods of training and education. It should, however, be pointed out that even in other African countries with relatively different experience, the reliance on expatriates for professional and technical services is also common. The only issue is that, depending on the social origins of the problem, a degree of variability occurs in this dependence, and Zambia's, as at present, is on the very high side. But it should, however, be stated that the situation cannot be blamed entirely on the past experience of Zambia. It is also related to her present rapid rate of industrial expansion which necessitates a high demand for qualified personnel, and to the fact that the many industries imported since independence brought, in the commissioning stages, skilled expatriate labour, which continues to stay in the country years after. From the figures in Table 1, it appears that the real bottleneck to further improvement is in the scarcity of teachers needed to produce a literate, healthy and sufficiently responsive society: persons educated enough to fill technical and professional posts and thus correct the present imbalance in the system.

TABLE 1

Percentage of Zambians in Various Occupations in 1968

Occupation	Percentage Zambians
(a) Administrative Executive	71
(b) Professional	19
(c) Technical and Related	59
(d) Clerical, Health, Police, Prisons	82
(e) Teachers (Primary Schools)	95
(f) Teachers (Secondary Schools)	8
(g) Teachers (others)	17
TOTAL	76

Source: Zambian Manpower – Report, 1969, p. 6

The difference in the wages bill also continues to favour expatriates. To quote from a recent government report: "There is a marked difference in the pay of Africans and non-Africans in Zambia. Non-Africans, who occupied most of the jobs requiring higher education or training, have been paid eight to ten times as much as their African co-workers. In 1964, 32,000 non-Africans, whose annual pay averaged K3,294, received about 54 per cent of all wage and salary payments, while 237,000 Africans, earning an average of K382 per year, shared the remaining 46 per cent"[5]. In addition, the fact that educated Zambians earn about the same salary (less inducement allowances) as expatriates, has also created a big gap between the wages of educated and uneducated Zambians.

In the short run, and in the light of existing labour conditions, the economic consequences of the dual employment structure could be expected to be minimal. In fact, the situation is not peculiar to Zambia and is one way out of the obvious dilemma of being able to cope with modernization in the absence of an indigenous pool of skilled manpower. Nevertheless, in terms of the wages bill, the fact that expatriate salaries have been so high has meant that a considerable proportion of the income they earn is consumed on imported goods and/or repatriated to countries of origin. At present, expatriates are allowed to repatriate 50 per cent of their earnings, and although the repatriated sums may not be as high as this, the chances are that substantial sums are taken out during or at the end of their contracts in Zambia. As already indicated above, the existence of this situation is at present justified by the scarcity of indigenous skilled labour, even though in the long run, if perpetuated, the situation could, to a significant degree, affect the margin of savings and investment in the country. Already, the inherited dual wage system has, at one time or another, affected the incomes policy of this country. The wage differential has partly encouraged and intensified local demand for wage increases. A classic illustration of the effect of this comes out clearly in the January 1953 Guillebaud award of a 77 per cent increase in the starting rate of surface employees and 63 per cent in that of underground workers in the copper mines. It is significant to note that the Commissioner in making the award was not motivated by any shortage of African labour but only by the need to correct the imbalance between African and expatriate wages[6]. Furthermore, as recently as 1966, the Brown Commission of Inquiry was appointed to examine "the wide differences in wages and other conditions particularly as between expatriates and local employees - disparities which were closely patterned on race – which had led to a sixfold increase in the rate of industrial stoppages in the mining industry in the first half of 1966 as compared with 1965"[7]. That this tendency has prevailed aided, no doubt, by increased African union activities since the early fifties, improved education and skills, and overall industrial prosperity is indicated by the fact that recently the wages of non-Africans increased at a slower rate than of Africans. For instance, in spite of the keen demand for expatriate labour throughout the economy, the average annual increase in their wages during 1964/68 was only 9 per cent as compared with 17 per cent for Africans[8].

The wages bill apart, another consequence of the dual employment system is the high expatriate labour turnover rate. Most expatriates come out to work on contract for relatively short periods of mostly two or three years. Being generally new to the environment, they usually take time to get adjusted to full-swing activity in their chosen fields of operation. This and other adjustment problems often leave insufficient time for projects mounted by them to materialize and, more important, for the Africans understudying them to acquire proficiency and skill. As methods of training and approach to work may differ from person to person, the high turnover rates lead invariably to inconsistency and lack of continuity in the training and execution of programmes. Attitudes to work and inter-personal relationship in employment are also affected by the ill-feelings engendered by the dual economic structure. There exist what might be termed hangovers or vestiges of the system which still encourage feelings of superiority in some expatriates, who want to perpetuate their previously entrenched privileged position. An important manifestation of this is the unwillingness of some expatriates to train African subordinates, claiming that this is outside the terms of their contracts.

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[5] Republic of Zambia, Development Division, Office of the Vice-President, *Zambian Manpower*, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1969, p. 11.

[6] *op cit* – Baldwin, p. 98.

[7] Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Labour and Social Development, *Government Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Mining Industry* (Brown Report), Government Paper No. 1 of 1966, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1966.

[8] *op cit* – Zambian Manpower, 1969, pp. 11-12.

Another issue, also arising from the past experience of Zambia, is the potential conflict, almost certain to exist in the very near future, between the present generation of less educated Zambians in senior administrative and executive posts and the oncoming younger generation now undergoing training at universities and institutions of higher education in and outside the country. Indeed, with the progress in education on a scale never known before in this country, there is bound to be a rise in the level of attainment, proficiency and expectations. Compared with the level of education expected of senior office bearers, "the percentage even of those who completed secondary school at the time of joining the civil service is rather low (32.8 per cent) and nearly half (48.4 per cent) have merely completed Grade 7 or Form II. There are only six who completed a degree and four who did some post-graduate work in addition to two who studied for a degree and did not make it. To sum up, the standard of formal education of the majority of higher civil servants whatever their ability is not high and an enormous burden is thrown on in-service training to fill the educational gap"[9].

By contrast, the budding younger generation, with higher levels of education, will almost certainly have to compete for their employment positions more on merit and achievement than anything else. The acute scarcity of skilled and professional Zambians which aided many of the present senior officers to their positions will not operate comparably in favour of the younger generation. And more important, of course, is the obvious fact that the realization of their hopes and ambitions as more educated persons, will place them in conflict with the older generation, who, no doubt, would wish for their part to retain control of the top jobs.

It is possible to go on naming other problems arising from Zambia's inherited dual economic system, but of greater importance is to recognize the reasons why they persist, and how they could be rectified. It is gratifying that, at the government level, an awareness exists of the problems involved, and one major attempt to come to grips with some of them has been in the field of education and training. Universal free primary education is provided and secondary school facilities have expanded significantly with the number of enrolled students rising from 7,050 in 1963 to over 34,000 in 1967. In addition, secondary school leavers with good performance can now proceed to the new University of Zambia for training in professional, executive and administrative skills.

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[9] Subramaniam, Y., "The Social Background of Zambia's Higher Civil Servants and Undergraduates", p. 3. *Paper read at the University Social Science Conference,* Nairobi, December, 1969.

Of the problems confronting the government in carrying out her education programme, the major one is the supply of a sufficient number of trained teachers. At present, there is a heavy dependence on expatriates, but this will, no doubt, phase out as more and more Zambians pass through teacher training colleges (some old, others newly established). At the graduate level, the government channels a number of students into studying teaching subjects. As some of the students do not fancy teaching as a career, and given the competitive wage and employment market in Zambia, it seems important that the government should adopt measures which will induce the prospective graduate teachers to stay on and teach. This is particularly important because we know very well that the current scarcity of Zambian-trained teachers is aggravated by the number of teachers who move out of education into more lucrative positions elsewhere in the economy.

Also, care should be taken in future to see that the services of trained teachers permeate the rural primary schools, which in many other respects, such as medium of instruction, use of modern audio-visual aids and content of syllabus, are not as well provided for as the schools in towns. The same thing goes for the non-fee paying schools in the towns which are staffed by less qualified teachers. As for the secondary schools, the significance of including more science subjects in secondary school teaching has been emphasized elsewhere. They are, no doubt, essential if the future supply of professional staff and technicians is to be assured. In the author's view, however, it is not strictly speaking as essential to introduce practical subjects such as welding, carpentry, typing and so on at an early stage in school curricula as it is to impart to children the fundamental subjects and mental approach needed to enable them to pick up these trades without undue difficulty when they decide to take them up. Teaching these subjects early in schools has two advantages only; training pupils in self-reliance and in appreciating that such trades have meaning and dignity in their own context as have any other jobs.

One important issue, as far as fostering ability in trades is concerned, is the establishment of more technical and professional schools where pupils selected on merit can attend and qualify after primary schooling. Zambia has, until recently, failed to place enough emphasis on the significance of developing technical education, and this is testified to by the very few institutions offering training at various technical levels in the country[10]. It is, however, gratifying that this anomaly is now being corrected through the government's establishment of the *Commission for Technical Education and Vocational Training*, which it is hoped will co-ordinate old and new programmes planned by government and the private sector.

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[10] *op cit* – Manpower Report, 1969, p. 58.

Population Problems

No account of the labour problems in most developing countries will be complete without an adequate consideration of demographic influences. The population factor, it can be said, is at the root of most development problems in Africa. Whether we consider capital or land resources which also influence the level of development, we come up against the inescapable fact that the size, composition and distribution of population have an overriding influence on the level and utilization of other developmental resources. In the Zambian and African context, the scarcity of investment capital apart, the relationship between population growth, distribution and land resources, has significant relevance for a full understanding of employment, unemployment and the dependency burden. It is not very often that the man in the street appreciates sufficiently the influence of population on industrialization and employment, and this partly arises from the fact that population characteristics, such as growth and distribution, mostly bear an indirect connection with transitions in industrialization and employment.

In fact, the effect of population growth on employment particularly in a country like Zambia is relatively difficult to establish. The realities of the situation are that at present this country enjoys one of the lowest population densities (12 persons per square mile in 1963)[11] in Africa, and it has therefore together with countries like Botswana and Angola, a favourable man-land ratio. Even if we question the crudeness or adequacy of crude density measures, the favoured position of Zambia is, relatively at least, unquestionable. But the other side of the coin is that the rate of population growth is very high and hovers between 2.5 and 3.2 per cent yearly. The estimated average crude birth rate lay between 43 and 52 per thousand while crude death rate was between 16 and 20 per thousand[12]. It is the rapid rate of increase implied in these figures which, in the long run, is of greater concern than the current absolute population size and density.

Thus, in the circumstances, a high rate of population increase investment-wise, could more than off-set the contribution to economic prosperity which all other factors make, assuming they are in sufficient supply. While land is relatively plentiful, capital for industrialization is scarce, and what is worrying is the fact that the present high rate of population growth appears at least in the long run, to be more rapid than the rate of expansion of opportunities for productive employment. For instance, we know that the country's Gross Domestic Product during the execution of the First Development Plan (1966) increased yearly at a good rate of 5.8 per cent, but for other reasons, the rate was only equal to half the level envisaged by the plan. It is also known that the target of creating 100,000 more jobs by 1970 envisaged in the same First National Development Plan has received some slight setback. Since the middle of 1968, when the wages sector offered some 354,730 positions, the level of employment has fallen by almost 10,000 jobs to 345,880 in December, 1968[13]. The decline has been attributed to growing capital substitution and less dependence on labour especially in the mines, which have resorted to rationalization as a result of rising labour costs. Also, the construction boom witnessed in the early years after independence has suffered some recession recently, while commercial farming, consequent upon the departure of expatriate farmers since independence, no longer offers so many job opportunities. Of the factors responsible for the population increase, fertility has greater economic consequences. Mortality is not as important mainly because it has only a slight effect on the distribution of the population by age and scant effect on the proportion of the population that are children. We know that if fertility remains unchanged, a reduction in mortality usually increases the proportion of children. This is simply because a reduction in mortality typically bears most on infancy and early childhood, and rather than make the population older, it makes it younger.

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[11] Republic of Zambia, *Final Report of the May/June*, 1963, *Census of Africans*, Central Statistical Office, Lusaka, 1968.

[12] Figures emerging from the 1969 national census.

Thus there is no doubt that the high fertility in Zambia is producing a large proportion of children and a small proportion, in consequence, of adults in the economically most productive age groups. According to the 1963 census[14], about 42.6 per cent of the population was below the age of 15. This is in contrast to a maximum between 25 and 30 per cent in highly industrialized countries. The dependency burden imposed on the economically active by the high level of fertility shows clearly that potentially 86 persons – of whom 83 are children, the rest being old persons aged 65 years or more – will depend on every 100 persons 15-64 years of age for support. Only 53.8 per cent of the population were, in fact, in the working age group and this rate is slightly less favourable than would obtain in a less rapidly expanding population. Looking ahead and wishing to illustrate the contrasting levels of economic burden implied in Zambia having a low or high fertility, different levels of dependency burden have been calculated as shown in Table 2 based on projected population figures. It is obvious that over the time perspective envisaged, low fertility will be accompanied by low total dependency burden. In this case, old age dependency burden will increase, but a significant fall in the level of childhood dependency will bring down the overall level of dependency. The desirability of attaining such a low level in Zambia cannot be over-stressed, for there is no doubt that a population with a high burden of child dependency feels a constant pressure at both the personal and national level to divert investment funds to less immediately productive uses such as education and the provision of other social amenities. In fact, what happens in most cases of rapid population growth is that national wealth is spent in maintaining rather than improving education and the standard of living. Apart from the increased burden borne by workers in this respect, it must be noted that a fertility level such as prevails in Zambia will also, in the long run, make significant additions to the number of persons in the labour force as children graduate through life into higher age groups. This would necessarily involve creating additional jobs (wage or self-employment) to absorb the new entrants.

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[13] Republic of Zambia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, Vol. V, No. 9, September, 1969, p. 2.

[14] *op. cit.* – 1963 Census figures.

TABLE 2

Dependency Burden and Potential Work Force under High and Low Fertility Conditions for Various Years in Zambia

	1963 Census	1983 Estimate		2003 Estimate	
	Assumed Fertility Levels:*				
	High	High	Low	High	Low
Childhood (under 15 years) dependency	83.1	92.0	81.1	95.8	92.5
Old Age (65+) dependency	2.9	4.6	4.6	4.9	5.5
Total dependency	86.0	96.6	85.7	100.7	58.0
Work Force Potential (15-64)	53.8	50.9	53.9	49.8	63.3

Source: Zambian Manpower, Development Division, Office of the Vice-President, Government Printer, Lusaka, 1969, pp. 118-120.

"The high fertility level was taken to be equal to that prevailing in 1963 when the fertility rate was estimated as 233.5 births per thousand females aged 15-44. The level in the lower fertility model was put at the same level as the high initially, and was later allowed to fall gradually at first, but at an accelerating rate to 116.8 at the end of the century."

The other significant demographic variable with a bearing on the employment problem is population distribution, the most significant aspect being the marked cleavage between rural and urban population patterns. As stated earlier in this paper, Zambia's population density is very low. There is, therefore, very little suggestion that the current phenomenal growth of population in urban areas is related to the existence of high rural population densities, which in Asian and Latin American countries constitute one of the main reasons for migration from rural areas to the towns. In striking contrast, in Zambia the exploitation of marginal lands and/or the fragmentation of land have not appeared on the agricultural scene. But agricultural density could increase in the years ahead in view of the rapid rate of population growth, the difficulties in acquiring more and more capital investment, and the problem of the urban areas absorbing new rural migrants. Indeed, the process might be speeded up by the government's programme of village regrouping and rural development, which could diversify the rural economy and keep more people on the land.

In simple economic terms, the rapidly growing drift of rural dwellers to towns in Zambia is associated with the problem of achieving an internal balance of the economy with respect to full employment, wage distribution and stability of price levels. Very much a continuation of the trend planted in pre-independence days, the rural economy is not sufficiently monetized and attractive. Agriculture remains essentially on a subsistence basis for nearly three-quarters of the country's population and marketing facilities for surplus commodities are inhibited by transport difficulties and the lack of adequate management. Besides, continuous employment throughout the year is not guaranteed for many rural dwellers as a result of the lack of diversification of economic undertakings and because of the seasonal nature of agriculture, which, with insufficient capital, often faces great natural hazards. As participants directly or indirectly in the business life of the community, the rural workers, with low wages and a rapidly rising cost of living brought about partly by rising urban wages, have also enjoyed far fewer benefits (education being a major exception) from services provided by the government than the urban workers[15]. Thus confronted with so many economic disadvantages, not experienced by their urban counterparts, the rural dwellers converge on the towns in vindication of the long established fact that migration to cities is primarily motivated by economic considerations. In this paper, it is only possible to indicate the dimensions of the problems of rapid urbanization experienced in recent years. Available statistics show clearly that the average rate of increase in the total population of larger urban centres on the Copperbelt and at Lusaka has been between 7 and 10 per cent in 1964 and 1965[16]. More recently, the writer's estimate based on the 1963 and 1969 National Census of Zambia clearly puts the average annual rate of increase for Lusaka alone above 10 per cent, the major part of the growth being accounted for by the flow of persons from the rural areas. This view is supported by the fact that new registrations at the Employment Exchange tend to be dominated by recent arrivals. In Lusaka alone in April, 1967, 32 per cent were in this category[17]. Also in support of the contention is the fact clearly stated about Greater Lusaka Area by the Doxiades Associates that "as much as 85 per cent of the total population increase between 1963 and 1968 is due to net immigration and only 15 per cent . . . to natural increase. The average annual rate of the two components of growth implied by this development would be about 10 per cent and 1.8 per cent for net migration and natural increase respectively . . ."[18]

As a result of this in-migration, the urban areas have failed to grapple with the needs of the migrants in terms of employment and social amenities. The figure of 11.2 per cent unemployed for Greater Lusaka[19] and the rapid mushrooming of shanty locations on the outskirts of the cities bear eloquent testimony to the problem posed by migrants. On the one hand, as a result of this townward drift, there follows the rapid denudation of the rural areas of their valuable young and virile labour force which, on the other hand, finds its way into the complex trappings of urban life, unemployed, unsheltered and exposed to the socio-psychological tensions, of the towns. For many people, especially the unskilled, migration to towns has been an exchange of one form of destitution for another.

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[15] *op. cit.* – Zambian Manpower, 1969.

[16] Republic of Zambia, *Annual Report of the Labour Department*, 1966, p. 3.

[17] Republic of Zambia, *Annual Report of the Labour Department*, 1967, p. 2.

[18] Doxiades Associates, *Greater Lusaka Area, Existing Conditions: A Report Prepared for the Government of the Republic of Zambia*, 1969, p. 91.

[19] *Ibid.* p. 112.

The primary concern of government in connection with population distribution has been how to make rural life more meaningful and attractive and thereby to check the rush of young people to the towns. This is part of the policy of achieving an internal balance of the economy as between the rural and urban areas in the way clearly stated in the Mulungushi Reforms, which is the blue print for Zambia's economic transformation. Speaking of the plight of the rural dwellers, His Excellency the President, aptly declared: "The trend (in Zambia's development) at the moment is to penalize the poorest of the poor by making them poorer"[20]. To be able to promote an all-year-round activity and thus eliminate part-time unemployment and/or underemployment, a programme of making the agricultural sector more productive and profitable has been mapped out by government. The programme, which will involve government bodies, co-operative societies and private commercial farmers, entails some degree of diversification – a move away from the present one-crop farming of maize and/or cassava in most parts to multiple cropping, animal husbandry, poultry and vegetable growing. In particular, the government offers various forms of training and provides extension services including advice and assistance to small farmers.

In other directions, rural development will be given an additional fillip by government through the establishment of small-scale industries in rural areas. This should provide a valuable economic stimulus in an area where despite no serious population pressures, there is, nonetheless, a shortage of capital for technological development – indeed an adequately functioning cash economy is sadly lacking, sometimes virtually non-existent, in the rural sector. Moreover, recognition is also given by government to other measures intended to monetize the rural economy. To this end, transport facilities and roads have been and will continue to be improved so that the farmer can market his surplus produce and buy other goods and basic necessities much cheaper by reducing transport costs. Also, greater business opportunity has and will be offered to the rural dweller by prohibiting expatriate participation in business in the rural and other designated areas. Decentralized administrative, political and economic committees have been formed in some areas to implement these rural reforms.

One important obstacle to rural economic and social transformation has been the lack of dense rural settlements in Zambia. Villages are usually small and scattered, and this makes very difficult the provision of social services and other amenities. The government has therefore a programme of regrouping villages to encourage an optimum use and supply of services. The tasks involved in doing this are, no doubt, formidable and require to be backed by basic scientific research into attitudes, values, habits, modes of social organization and economic ways of life. It is not only necessary to supply these village groups with an alternative economic foundation to the one that exists in the urban areas, but also a firm social foundation, in order to reduce social frictions, economic dissatisfaction among settlers, and a return to the old situation of scattered family units, should the social and economic incentives prove insufficient.

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[20] His Excellency Dr. K. D. Kaunda, "Industrial and Agricultural Development". In Bastiaan de Gaay Fortman (Ed.), *After Mulungushi: The Economics of Zambian Humanism*, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1969.

The type of economic activity to be encouraged in the new villages is a matter for debate. Some would opt for the combined development of agriculture as well as industrialization. In the Zambian situation, it seems to the author, more economical to implement a predominantly agricultural programme initially, because land is at present plentiful and because it would on the whole involve less capital spending. It is only later when the abundance of new entrants into the labour force cannot find employment in agriculture because the limit of expansion has been reached, and when capital becomes more available, that small-scale industries should form part of a major programme. Perhaps a case could be made for combining initially a full-scale agricultural programme with a number of small service industries to cater for the primary needs of the villagers.

On the issue of rapid population growth, it seems certain that if it could be demonstrated, given Zambia's favourable man-land ratio, that capital growth would always be adjusted to absorb a growing labour force, dependency burden and socio-economic needs, then it might not be necessary to have a population control programme. We have, however, shown that, at least in the long run, the pressure of rapid population growth will make itself felt. At present, no formal population limitation policy has been adopted by the government. People in and outside parliament have recently spoken of the advantages of establishing family planning programmes, and we have evidence that educated Zambians are taking advantage of services offered by private practitioners. The government's reaction to all this has been democratic and *laissez faire*. Without discounting the chances that an official policy might emerge in future, this attitude seems encouraging and might pave the way for a widespread voluntary acceptance of family limitation as education and information about the availability of services permeate various layers of the society.

Discussion, Summary and Conclusion

Zambian workers have, since achieving political independence, been battling with the more fundamental problem of achieving greater economic prosperity. Some degree of progress has been attained; wages as well as gross productivity and the number of employment positions have gone up mostly in the towns. Whether productivity per worker has also gone up is presently debatable. *The Zambian Manpower Report* of 1969, using one set of statistics, thinks that productivity went up by 12 per cent during 1964/68, while the Turner Report[21], using another set of data, argued that it declined by the same rate during the same period. Although it appears that one would be certain of the actual trend only when one reconciles the statistical approaches and resources employed in compiling the two reports when and if more data came to light in future, one is inclined to appreciate an important economic reason behind Professor Turner's view. He argues, logically enough, that productivity did not show an increase commensurate with the huge capital input in the period. As he put it: "What is especially surprising about this fall (in productivity), is that it has happened despite the very high rate of investment in Zambia (averaging nearly a quarter of the gross national product) which by providing the workers with more equipment ought to have raised output per head"[22].

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[21] Cabinet Office, Lusaka, *Report to the Government of Zambia on Incomes, Wages and Prices in Zambia: Policy and Machinery*, ILO, Geneva (Turner Report), Government Printer, Lusaka, 1969.

The rural areas gained relatively little from post-independence developments. The existing impoverishment of village units along with the struggle to improve the quality of the Zambian labour force are just some of the relics of pre-independence cleavage of the economic structure into the industrial and the subsistence sectors. Unfortunately the division then involved the bulk of the Africans in subsistence farming and prepared them poorly for the assumption of responsibilities in the industrial economy through lack of training and education. Physically, only the towns and those areas along the line of rail to Zambia's vital copper mines were developed. These towns and areas, therefore, continued to attract rural dwellers wanting to escape the economic difficulties posed by inadequate transport, cash, and social amenities. But the flow of rural migrants to the towns has, however, exceeded expectations and consequently this has multiplied the dimensions of social problems and unemployment in the urban areas. Indeed, it is expected that in the future, if not at present, the magnitude of these problems will undoubtedly increase due to the additional impact of rapid population growth on the utilization and availability of developmental resources. An appreciation of the implications of rapid population growth was put very succintly by the Vice-President of Zambia in his address to workers during the May Day rally on the Copperbelt in 1970. He stressed the need for family planning, saying that Zambia's present birth rate might lead to massive unemployment in the future[23].

In conclusion, it should be stated that the current policy measures for improving the quality of labour and reducing rural economic and social stagnation are commendable. The shifting of emphasis in the overall growing educational system to technical training, the decentralization of development and government administration and the attempts made to teach self-reliance and hard work are moves in the right direction. It is only necessary to add that improved systematization, research and organization would enhance the possibilities of future successes in these endeavours.

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[22] *Ibid*, p. 14.

[23] *Times of Zambia*, Saturday, 2nd May, 1970.

Ujamaa Villages:
Institutional Change in Rural Tanzania

By JOHN CONNELL

Mr. Connell is a Research Assistant at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex.

TANZANIA is poor, sparsely settled and with a communications system that, despite a considerable post-independence investment in roads, remains underdeveloped even by East African standards*[1]. The majority of the population are concerned with the production of staple food crops for their own consumption and despite a gradual movement towards a commercial economy subsistence, agricultural activities represented 26 per cent of the GDP in 1968/69 and total agricultural output accounts for 50 per cent of the GDP and 82 per cent of exports. Both these represent some of the highest figures in Africa. Despite general rural-urban migration and the rapid growth of Dar-es-Salaam from 69,000 in 1948 to 273,000 in 1967, some 94 per cent of Tanzania's (1967) population of 12,231,000 live in the rural areas. In Africa only Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, Burundi and Lesotho have smaller urban proportions.

Since Independence in 1961 the Tanzanian development effort has been increasingly concentrated on this rural sector. Yet early rural development policies were consistently stories of failure; inadequate administration and inadequate planning resulted in the collapse of most Colonial schemes[2]. The early post-Independence People's Plan[3] launched by the Prime Minister, Rashidi Kawawa in 1962, aimed at establishing autonomous village development committees their task being to plan individual village development schemes, in the belief that a spirit of self-help, following the declaration of independence, would develop in every locality. However, the scheme was largely unsuccessful because of limited extension manpower, limited involvement of local peasants and some conflict between old village leaders and new TANU leaders[4]. Over centralization and a bureaucracy that was not yet ready to cope with the number of village plans sent to Dar-es-Salaam from all the Regions were additional reasons for the failure to implement the Kawawa proposals. Within a year of Independence the failure of this kind

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**The Tanganyika Mainland of Tanzania extends over* 362,000 *square miles, a much greater area than that comprising Kenya or Uganda.*—Ed.

[1] L. Berry, *Tanzania in Maps* (London, 1971).

[2] C. Brooke, Types of Food Shortage in Tanzania, *Geographical Review* (57), July, 1967, p. 342.

[3] Government of Tanganyika, "Outlines of proposals for a 'crash' plan for local development on a self-help basis" (Dar-es-Salaam, May, 1962).

[4] V. Junod, Community Development and National Planning: the Tanganyika case, *International Review of Community Development* (15-16), 1966, 165-178.

of approach had resulted in a shift from self-help and voluntary labour schemes to nation building projects and a policy of villagization. A Rural Settlement Commission was established, with a Village Settlement Agency as its executive section, and it began work in 1963. The First Five Year Plan of 1964[5] recommended the establishment of over 69 model village settlement schemes but again, by 1966, the whole scheme had been abandoned.[6] The cost was out of all proportion to the development achieved. More exceptional and important were new village developments in Ruvuma Region in the south where 20 more or less collective farming villages were operating in 1967. These were linked in a Ruvuma Development Association and consisted of 20 to 30 families per village farming collectively and sharing the profits equally[7]. Although their economic success was limited, they were, in several ways, more successful than the government sponsored settlement schemes, partly because of overcapitalization of the latter and partly because the Ruvuma settlers were more enthusiastic and hardworking.

Redefinition of rural development policy followed the formulation in February, 1967, of the Arusha Declaration, the basic components of which[8] were an increased emphasis on rural and agricultural development, coupled with a movement towards rural socialism that stressed the building of *ujamaa* ("brotherly" in the sense of co-operative and communal) villages rather than state farms, estates or individual peasant farms. A new education policy fitted into this framework by reflecting socialist values and by emphasizing primary education and the preparation for a rural existence. The whole was essentially a statement of socialism and self-reliance, but recognized that there would be some conflicts between economic growth and the establishment of an egalitarian society.

Although changes following the Arusha Declaration were felt in three other agricultural sectors, the estates, the State farms and the co-operatives[9], the most important single part of the new approach to rural development was that of the creation of *ujamaa* villages. This is the basis of the Arusha Declaration, the Second Five Year Plan[10] and Nyerere's paper "Socialism and Rural Development";[11] the crux of the *ujamaa* village is that it is intended to synthesize the old style of life in terms of mutual respect, holding of all basic goods in common and the obligation of all to work, with a new style of life which removed both inequality, of women especially, and poverty. This was to be done through the organization and reorganization of the rural areas into *ujamaa* villages. "A nation of such village communities would be a socialist nation. For an essential element in them would be the equality of all members of the community, and the members' self-government in all matters which concerned only their own affairs. For a really socialist village would elect its own officials and they would remain equal members with the others, subject always to the wishes of the people. Only in relation to work discipline would there be any hierarchy, and then such officials would be merely acting for the village as a whole"[12].

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[5] United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, *Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development*, 1964-1969. (Dar-es-Salaam, 1964). Vol. 1. General Analysis, pp. 33-36.

[6] J. Connell, Ujamaa Vijijini: the Evolution of Tanzanian Rural Development, *J. of Tropical Geography*, 1972 (in press).

[7] R. Ibbott, Ruvuma Development Association, Mbioni (3), 2nd July, 1966, 3-43.

[8] J. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (Dar-es-Salaam, 1968).

[9] J. Connell, *ibid*.

[10] United Republic of Tanzania, *Second Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development*, 1969-1974 (Dar-es-Salaam, 1969).

[11] In J. Nyerere, *op cit*.

Progress was expected to follow three stages for any single village. The first would be where a group of people move their houses into a single village and plant their crops for the following year; the second is where the group start a small communal plot on which they work co-operatively and share the proceeds. The final stage occurs when the villagers have sufficient confidence in the new community to invest all their efforts into it, keeping only their own private vegetable gardens. It was expected that there would be considerable problems in the earliest years and therefore that the experience of the Ruvuma villages, which are now some of the most advanced *ujamaa* villages, would serve as a practical example for others elsewhere.

In the early period after the Arusha Declaration progress was slow and by December 1968 there were only 180 villages (with 58,000 villagers). In December, 1969, there were 650 and in December, 1970, 1,630. The latest official figures indicate 2,670 in June, 1971 (with 840,000 villagers). They are spread unevenly within the country; Kilimanjaro, Morogoro and Mwanza Regions have very few whilst Ntwara, with 850, has considerably more than any other region[13]. The vast majority are in the economically less well-developed areas and especially in the southern regions bordering Mozambique, although the most remarkable growth occurred in Dodoma in 1971 when some 80 villages were established in three months. Areas where there is a large amount of well-developed capitalist agriculture, profitable small holdings and considerable pressure on land have very few *ujamaa* villages.

Since *ujamaa* villages were supposed to be at least partly spontaneous, the idea of a plan to guide this spontaneity is clearly partly contradictory. So, too, is the formulation of an optimal size, especially because of its anticipation of some kind of finality in the move towards *ujamaa* and in the considerable regional variations in size and structure. Already, whilst there are villages with less than ten households, there are also villages such as Chamwino (Dodoma Region) with a reported population of 6,000 in October, 1971. Although Nyerere has pointed out that there are advantages in starting very small since the members will know each other, be able to work together and make collective decisions, villages of such widely differing sizes as now exist can share few common experiences and approaches to development. Before Independence nucleated settlement patterns were unusual hence *ujamaa* villages are both a different economic and organizational approach to rural development.

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[12] J. Nyerere, *ibid*, p. 127.

[13] J. Connell, *opcit*.

The convictions of the peasants were critical to their decision to join *ujamaa* villages. Generally large farmers were unwilling since they were already successful and in the short term their production, and hence profits, was almost certain to decline; very poor farmers were conservative for other reasons. Their low margin enabled little scope for experimentation and innovation and they were concerned about co-operation with non-kin and the future of their rights after their death. Obviously this was particularly so in the poorest regions; and especially among pastoral albeit often comparatively wealthy pastoral areas; there are not yet, for example, any Masai *ujamaa* villages. Those who were most keen to join were young men, often without any land, who were untypical of the general population of Tanzania. (A corollary of this is that the *ujamaa* villages have very high birth-rates and low workforce-dependency ratios, thus imposing considerable strain on agricultural production). Since many *ujamaa* villages were in the more marginal areas, shortages of extension personnel meant that it was rarely possible to open up villages for landless youths. Thus there was a general conflict between peasant participation, which lacked both the practical means and the political theory to implement coherent development strategies, and government policies, both practical and theoretical, for which there was inadequate skilled educational or agricultural manpower to transmit them to the local areas.

Two major organizational devices were introduced after Independence to further nation-building and both are exceptionally important in *ujamaa* villages. The first was a network of Village Development Committees (VDCs) and the second was the establishment of TANU cells in 1964/65. In 1963 the old village headmen were removed and the village councils were integrated into the VDCs which were established in 1964; in 1966 there were possibly 7,500 of these, many only in name.[14] The intention was that these should govern as a kind of combination of village council, elders' council, development committee and TANU organization and initially that they should also be the official TANU organization at village level. The available evidence merely indicates that some committees were able to create and maintain communities, whilst others met traditional opposition.[15] The VDC chairman should be elected by the TANU committee with the VDC varying from 5 to 20 members, according to the size of village, and usually having a monthly meeting. The largest VDCs actually contain over 100 members, representing 5-10,000 people, spread over a wide area; hence as the population becomes grouped in *ujamaa* villages, the VDCs should become more effective as their organization becomes more straightforward and they represent fewer people.

TANU cells were introduced at the end of 1964 in an attempt to make TANU's presence felt in the countryside through the raising and consideration of grievances and exceptionally by the co-ordination of cells and

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[14] H. Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton, 1970), p. 350; C. G. Knight, Fieldwork and Local Government: an example from Tanzania, *African Studies Bulletin*, 12(3), December, 1969, 265-273.

[15] K. W. von Sperber, *Public Administration in Tanzania*, (Ifo-Institut, Munchen, Afrika Studien No. 55, 1970).

VDCs as a response to problems of security. The cells were initially organised within Dar-es-Salaam and spread, largely unchanged, into the rural areas. The basic administrative unit is the "ten house cell" (*kumi-kumi*) which is the smallest level of political organization. A village or town is divided into cells, each of up to ten houses, with its own chairman or leader (*balozi*) whose house is usually distinguished by the green and black TANU flag. He must now be a TANU member, although in the early years this was not essential. In some cases, cells are smaller or larger than ten, depending on household structure and the size of the village. The cells are essentially an attempt to make TANU effective at village level, largely in an educative role outlining party policy after Independence, and to enable greater effectiveness of control and communication. In addition it was expected that local views and feelings would be passed in the reverse direction to the national party although, almost inevitably, local parochialism tends to be destroyed at the expense of national unity. Occasionally, where a village is large and accessible, TANU Branch Offices have been established, which also deal mainly with political education. In Gallu *ujamaa* village (Mwanza Region)[16] the office consisted of a chairman and secretary elected by party members in the village, although it is more usual for the secretary to be a salaried officer chosen by the District TANU office. Ideally all villages should have some kind of political education yet few villages hold regular political meetings where the principles of *ujamaa* are outlined and discussed hence party policy is variably interpreted at village level. Nevertheless, the seminars that are organized in, particular *ujamaa* village by TANU, do have the effect of rapidly increasing the political consciousness of that village; the *ujamaa* village becomes closely identified with the national party and national policy. TANU membership is very high in the *ujamaa* villages.

In some areas problems emerged where cells usurped additional functions, such as those of the VDC and, to avoid further conflict, following a Government White Paper in 1966, government and party structures at the local level were integrated together with the TANU cell leaders now making up the membership of the VDCs, thus the political and functional differences have become extremely slight. The local party chairman is the VDC chairman and other members are likely to include leaders of the marketing co-operatives and any other local organizations. The VDC is increasingly much more powerful than the TANU cell. (In 1970 a decision was taken to replace the VDCs with Ward Development Committees, for more extended geographical areas, which is moving the development agencies further from the people.) Hierarchically above these institutions are the District Council and the TANU district committee, but the district-village link is the weakest link in both party and government organization.

The VDC usually contains a number of sub-committees for specific functions, such as finance, education, health, etc., and has its own constitution, based on a model constitution prepared by TANU, modified according to local conditions. The VDC hears cases of infringements of this constitution and has the authority to expel non-conforming individuals from the village, although this power is rarely used, more usual punishments being fines or extra work. A manager, secretary and treasurer are usually elected; the manager, as representative of the village externally, is the most important local leader. In the case of at least one large village, Kabuku (Tanga)[17], the village is divided into four sections, each with a six-man working committee, whilst Malya (Mwanza) is run by a 20-man general committee with three sub-committees for finance, economic planning and labour organization. TANU cells operate within this framework and are most important for the organization and recording of work loads. The system of work organization is closely related to the degree of co-operation since this determines the amount of work required on communal activities. A common situation is for the morning to be devoted to communal activities and the afternoon left for private activities; less commonly a certain number of days are set aside for each activity. Both at Mbambara (Tanga) and Nkulabi (Dodoma), for example, a whistle is sounded at 6 a.m. and at 7 a.m. the villagers assemble at the village office, where the daily work load is distributed and the villagers divided into work groups.[18] The work groups are ubiquitous and it would be rare for a job to be assigned to a single individual; almost inevitably the photographs chosen to illustrate articles on *ujamaa* in the Tanzanian press highlight this through an emphasis on small groups striving together to clear a communal *shamba* (farm) or construct a road. Proceeds from the communal *shambas* are divided according to the work contributed, hence smooth organization is most easily achieved in those villages that have been initially the most successful economically.

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[16] R. K. Mashauri, Leadership Structure and Functions in an Ujamaa Village: a case study of Gallu, in J. H. Proctor, ed. *Building Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania*, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Studies in Political Science, No. 2 (Dar-es-Salaam, 1971), 55-63.

A major emphasis of the rural development programme is its concern that capitalist development does not take place in the countryside, that a "rural proletariat" of labourers is not created, dependent on the decisions of others for their existence, consequently subject to inequality and insecurity. The future equality of all Tanzanians would not result from the creation of wage labourers. Basic to the *ujamaa* village programme is the demand that there should be no wage employment either in the village or for village members, but even this seems to be only partly true and hired labourers have been reported in *ujamaa* villages in Dodoma, Iringa and Tanga where 700 out of 1,030 villagers in Kwamangugu village were expelled for refusing to give up outside wage labour[19]. Even in the agricultural sector in which the majority of *ujamaa* villages are directly and solely concerned labour requirements can vary widely throughout the year, especially in tobacco growing villages, hence a theoretical solution is for the exchange of workers between villages with different agricultural systems. In practice this has not yet been achieved successfully. When development in villages extends beyond agricultural processing this problem will increase. For example, Malya village (Mwanza) was able to establish a petrol station at a cost of 30.000/- (£1.800) in February, 1971. Clearly this is development of a rather different order and is liable without skilful work organization to create, at a minimum, differential economic and status situations within the village. Furthermore, this kind of development cannot be followed by all other villages, hence it may result in the establishment of an elite group of *ujamaa* villages and ultimately in very disparate development at a local level. Where even the removal of wage labour from within the *ujamaa* villages has so far been difficult the creation of an egalitarian society becomes almost impossible.

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[17] A. A. Riyami, Kabuku shows the Way to Ujamaa Living, *Standard* (*Tanzania*), 28th August, 1970.

[18] M. Kabigi *et alii*, Report on Mbambara Ujamaa Village, *Mbioni* 5 (7), 1969, 10-26; N. Kasihwaki, Villages help themselves to improve houses, *Standard* (*Tanzania*), 5th October, 1970.

[19] D. and R. Feldman, Co-operation and the Production Environment, Economic Research Bureau Paper 69: 12. (Dar-es-Salaam, 1969, p. 17).

In those villages where there is a permanent *Bwana Shamba* (Agricultural Extension Officer), he tends to function as a third type of leadership with political authority and prestige, because of his direct link with the District Council, but few villages do have a permanent *Bwana Shamba*, or indeed any agricultural advice, since in 1970 there was, on average, only one for every 1,000 farm families in Tanzania[20]. Nevertheless, the role of Agricultural Extension Officer is significant because of the officer's close direct links and ties outside the village: a result of this is occasional conflict between VDC and *Bwana Shamba*. More exceptionally some *ujamaa* villages also have a Development Assistant, who is responsible for general advice on community formation, and a Health Assistant.

The District Council channels necessary manpower, including the *Bwana Shamba*, and material assistance, such as building materials, medical supplies, pesticides, fertilizers, tools and seeds, to the *ujamaa* village. The amount of such material assistance results in considerable dependence by the village on regional, and ultimately national, authority, especially since some village-level allocation decisions are actually made at national level. Occasionally this becomes over-dependence with disappointing consequences, since the major problem of the *ujamaa* villages is the lack of skilled, trained leadership either coming from within the village or assisting from outside. It is hoped that public officers, retiring at 50, will provide a number of villages with useful leadership and expertise. Because of this lack of expert assistance, peasants were urged in October, 1969, to start *ujamaa* villages without waiting for expert assistance whilst the most recent Economic Survey reported, "The initial popular response to the concept of socialist agricultural productive communities was much wider than originally anticipated. As a result the (*ujamaa* village) programme is requiring more technical advice and agro-economic planning support than expected, creating a number of interim bottlenecks and planning problems"[21].

Critical to the development of *ujamaa* socialism is the comprehension by the peasants of *ujamaa* and their own part in the development effort. Consequently major efforts were extended into the construction of schools yet not many *ujamaa* villages have schools and even these have very high pupil-teacher ratios. Education therefore must be aimed simply at removing illiteracy and developing some understanding of *ujamaa*. "(Schools) . . . must prepare people for life and service in the villages and rural areas of this country. For in Tanzania, the only true justification for secondary education is that it is needed by the few for service to the many"[22]. Education is important in itself and in its practical application to problems of development, especially in the rural areas. A major failure of much education in lesser developed countries lies in its failure to integrate learning and living, resulting in the creation of an educated urban elite, primary schools especially are now oriented towards agriculture and almost all have some kind of school farm. Even so only 50 per cent of children in Tanzania receive any formal education. The aim of giving every child a primary school education is not expected to be achieved until at least 1989 and the increased post-Arusha Declaration burden has imposed a considerable strain on primary school teachers. After the Arusha Declaration, Swahili was introduced as the medium of instruction in almost all primary schools, and agricultural science has been introduced into all Standard V classes, whilst students from schools, colleges of education and the university take part in the activities of *ujamaa* villages. This participation is both practical and political – practical in that there is an interchange of ideas between villagers and students and the students carry out a large amount of work, and political in that this is one more visible example of Government interest in the development of the *ujamaa* villages and an attempt to develop a common peasant-student consciousness to prevent the formation of an educated elite.

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[20] L. Cliffe and J. Saul, The District Development Front in Tanzania, unpub. paper presented to Seminar on Changes in Tanzanian Rural Society and Their Relevance for Development Planning, Leiden, December, 1970.

[21] United Republic of Tanzania, *Economic Survey and Annual Plan*, 1970-71 (Dar-es-Salaam, 1970), p. 1.

Concurrent with the changing orientation of education there has been a massive increase in the publicity allotted to *ujamaa* villages. Since Arusha the development of *ujamaa* villages has received a constant and gradually increasing attention in the press and on the radio, especially after TANU took over the organization of the villages and the management of the Tanzanian Standard, although the effect of this is limited by the low levels of both literacy and radio ownership. With a literacy rate of 15 per cent and with one radio per 100 people in 1970, both concentrated in urban areas, it is almost inevitable that even the basic aims of *ujamaa* are misunderstood in many villages. In Nkulabi (Dodoma) a Development Assistant considered that his first task there was to explain to the Village Development Committee that they had to extend the communal shambas and limit their individual ones. Initially the VDC rejected this advice, "but after elaborating to them that this was in fact the very essence of *ujamaa* villages, they accepted".[23] Necessarily, since Nkulabi is far from exceptional, in many *ujamaa* villages political meetings are held, usually in the evenings, where problems and policies are discussed.

Practical education is therefore of more practical value, both by direction and by example. The President himself continually spends his vacations living and working either at Butiama *Ujamaa* Village, near Musoma (Mara), which is his own home, or at other villages, especially Chamwino (Dodoma). His example is followed by the other Tanzanian MPs. Increasingly, the importance of living in an *ujamaa* village is stressed and a basic qualification for potential candidates in the 1970 General Election was that they should have been living in and actively participating in *ujamaa* villages. Occasionally, however, publicity becomes excessive; in 1969, Twende Pamoja (Ruvuma) was praised as an example to others since it had been started in 1968 by thirteen teenagers, the oldest of whom was 17, and by 1969 had expanded to 25 youths, and in 1970 an *ujamaa* village was being planned next to the new Kilimanjaro International Airport as a tourist attraction. Furthermore, villages are regularly declared the best in their region; Nyavyumbu was declared the best in Kigoma Region in December, 1960, and was rewarded with six oxen and farming implements and tools worth 16,000/- (£940).

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[22] J. Nyerere, *op cit*, p. 24.
[23] N. Kasihwaki, *op cit*.

At a different pole from the organization of political consciousness through education of the young is that of political mobilization and education of older peasants (1970 was Adult Education Year), the explaining of the meaning of *ujamaa* and the benefits and advantages of *ujamaa* villages. This kind of education must be continued after establishment of new villages to ensure that development is maintained. Political mobilization is the responsibility of TANU which has a special division for *ujamaa* village development; this has been active in organizing various kinds of seminars for Party and Government leaders. Although seminars have been held in *ujamaa* villages, the major group, the peasants, have often scarcely been drawn into these training programmes. Trained officials go to live with them in the villages, but the general attitude is, "*we* shall teach them, *we* shall organize, *we* shall persuade", and then with reference to the President's ideas it is finally said, "but the decisions should be left with the people"[24]. Although in 1970 seminars were begun for village leaders, few teachers or *Mabwana Shamba* spend any length of time in the village; power is seen to exist as it is handed out by the government or its officers rather than as being in the hands of the peasants. There is therefore a basic problem in Nyerere's insistence that the creation of *ujamaa* villages should be fundamentally voluntary, within broad government prescribed limits, and the pre-existing situation in Tanzania, where a radical rural change is expected to occur on a voluntary basis, but without the kind of oppressive pre-conditions that could generate spontaneous change, since, for example, there is no oppressive social structure, except in very limited exceptions, and no need for extensive land reforms.

Despite, or possibly, because of, the TANU *balozis* in the *ujamaa* villages and the efforts of the TANU Youth League (TYL), which has produced a remarkably well-developed low-level political organization, there remains a high level of dependence on central government, manifested especially in the expectations of government allocations of new inputs. Acquisition of such goods as tractors can only be achieved through allocation, at least in the earlier phases of village development, and this allocation can only come from regional or national government to *ujamaa* villages. More important, not only the physical inputs, but also the evolving ideas come from above. To those rural people not in *ujamaa* villages, the *ujamaa* village will be regarded as a "government village rather than a village of the people"[25]. With the lower capitalization inherent in the *ujamaa* village policy, some of the problems of the earlier village settlement schemes are simply being repeated on a smaller scale and more ubiquitously. It is critical that farmers from the villages be fully involved in the transformation of theory into local practice so that local people be fully involved in all the stages of *ujamaa* development.

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[24] J. Rald, Ujamaa: Problems of Implementation (Experiences from West Lake), BRAWP Research Report No. 10. Dar-es-Salaam, May, 1970, p. 24.

There is a major difficulty in providing the necessary material assistance for the initial stage of village development. The problem is to find the balance between material assistance which encourages and motivates people to work, and assistance which has the reverse effect. Since most villages have been established in areas where natural conditions are at least marginal to future success, assistance is usually required at least over a short-term period, for example in the provision of housing while the first shambas are cleared and sown. There has, however, often been local feeling that if an *ujamaa* village is started, the Government must provide water, schools, houses, dispensaries, etc.

There is no overall policy for allocations to *ujamaa* villages; nor is there any particular pricing policy for the *ujamaa* sector. Unless pricing mechanisms are altered to discriminate in favour of *ujamaa* production, the success of the villages may be restricted to their ability to colonise marginal land. So far a combination of the location of *ujamaa* villages, usually distant from areas of land scarcity and hence capitalist agriculture, and minimal government appraisal and evaluation of the whole strategy of rural development, specifically the relationship between village development and other sections of the development front and the contribution of *ujamaa* villages to the prevention of class formation, has failed to result in any confrontation between capitalist and socialist forms. For the *ujamaa* village policy to be successful it must be seen as the only possible and practicable solution to Tanzanian rural development. Where there are alternatives, particularly successful alternatives, this is not possible. At the same time some villages have become successful and have managed to export a considerable surplus; although their success clearly acts as a stimulus to greater effort in other villages, at some stage restrictions must be imposed on their development and limitations must be placed on migration to them, so as to prevent the formation of an elite group of villages.

For co-operation to be channelled in the most efficient manner, village policy must be more effectively integrated into national and especially regional planning. Although *ujamaa* village sub-committees are being set up in several districts to ensure that individual village plans are integrated into district plans this is still restricted in extent and effectiveness. Considerable central control is exercised and this must be maintained since there is a strong possibility that full decentralization of authority would merely result in considerable regional inequalities as villages in different kinds of areas succeed or fail at variable rates.

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[25] J. Rald, *ibid*, p. 33.

There has been a considerable gap between national ideas and rural implementation since the Arusha Declaration. Time is not the only barrier to its execution; poor communications, both physical and political, inadequate local political and administrative institutions, the marginality of much of Tanzanian agriculture and the wide social and economic variations in rural Tanzania have meant that it is exceptionally difficult for any kind of rural development policy to be a national mass movement. There is strong evidence that if this policy is to be successfully oriented to the rural areas it must give much more consideration to the variable needs of local people. The conflicts between national, regional and village planning and between village development and estate, state farm and co-operative development have not yet been satisfactorily resolved.

The limited success of a policy of this kind is almost inevitable, especially where there is inadequate financial, educational and technical resources to administer change successfully. Low levels of economic development make it difficult to forge the political instruments that can both carry out and redirect centrally established goals and reconcile these goals with local demands. Tanzanian rural development is oriented away from the conventional assumptions that economic development is synonymous with individualism and inequality; neither is it simply another example of "the rhetoric of African socialism"[26]. It is, instead, a radical development strategy attempting to break away from a dependence on international capital and to attack existing local privilege, primarily through a restructuring of the economy towards co-operative production of food crops rather than towards capitalist commercial production. If the failures have so far outweighed the successes, as infant institutions and small numbers of technical manpower strive to grapple with formidable difficulties, the limited achievements of *ujamaa* are already a unique achievement in tropical Africa.

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[26] L. Cliffe, Traditional Ujamaa and Modern Producer Co-operatives, in C. G. Widstrand, ed. *Co-operatives in East Africa* (Upsala, 1970), p. 40.

Quarterly Notes

BRITAIN – *Legal Training*

Furtherance of co-operation between the different bodies now engaged in legal education, and making recommendations on the subject of training for a legal professional qualification in the two branches of the legal profession, were the main terms of reference of the Committee on Legal Education which was appointed in December, 1967, under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Ormrod. The main features of the Committee's report, which has been submitted recently, are surveyed below.

According to the Committee, the existing dual system of law teaching is not only unsatisfactory but also involves a duplication and overlap, leading to poor utilization of scarce resources, and therefore needs reorganization, whereby the academic and professional training can be integrated into a coherent whole.

The Committee draws the general conclusion that there is a need for variety of intake, for selective training, and for planning legal education in successive stages. The Committee observes:

> The training process must be planned on a three-stage basis, viz.:
>
> a. the academic stage, which should be taken at a university or similar institution;
>
> b. the professional stage, comprising both institutional training and in-training (i.e. partly vocational training and partly practical experience);
>
> c. continuing education or training.

The academic stage and the institutional part of the professional stage are to precede qualification.

The Committee is convinced that a university or college of higher education alone would be able to provide the academic stage as suggested.

In addition to those qualifying by law degree, the following classes of candidates would, according to the Report, be eligible to qualify in an alternative form at the academic stage:

i. graduates of universities (or equivalent) in the U.K. and Republic of Ireland whose degrees do not qualify for recognition as law degrees;

ii. graduates of foreign universities, at the discretion of the professional bodies;

iii. Fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives;

iv. mature students recognized as such by professional bodies.

The alternative form of qualification for these categories would consist of a common professional examination after a two-year course at university level.

As regards the professional stage – the period between the end of the academic stage and the granting of permission to start independent practice – the Committee feels that the institutional vocational courses and the in-training must be co-ordinated. The establishment, for this purpose, of not less than four university centres is suggested.

According to the minority view, however, a joint school organized and run by the two branches of the profession would provide a better place for legal training than a university. The final decision on this issue is to be left to the professional bodies.

The vocational course, which is to be "strongly practice-orientated", should, in the Committee's opinion, last for one academic year and should include:

a. practical exercises in professional problems and procedures;

b. some additional law subjects of a "practical" nature;

c. some introduction to certain non-legal subjects (e.g. business finance). Professional examinations at the end of the vocational courses should be tests of practical proficiency.

On the question of in-training, the Committee does not find any practical alternative to pupilage for the Bar and has suggested ways to improve the master-pupil relationship. Six months' pupilage and removal or transference of pupilage fees are suggested. For the in-training of solicitors, the Committee has supported the Law Society's proposals to abolish articles and to replace them by a period of three years' limited practice after qualification.

The central proposal contained in the report is that legal education for both branches of the profession should cover three stages: the academic, the professional or vocational, and the post-qualification. According to the recommendations it would, in the normal case, take four-and-a-half years (after leaving school) to start practice as a barrister, and seven years to set up an independent practice as a solicitor. Compared to the existing system, the proposed training periods are longer. Besides, entry to the profession consists mainly of graduates. It is to be expected that higher standards, greater co-operation between the two branches of the profession and better co-ordination of the legal education in this country would result from the implementation of the recommendations.

Source: The International and Comparative Law Quarterly

KENYA – *Public Service Review*

Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Public Service Structure and Remuneration) 1970/71*

This important Commission under the Chairmanship of Mr. Duncan Ndegwa was given wide terms of reference covering the organization, structure, pay, conditions of service, recruitment, etc., of the Kenya Public

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Service including local government and para-statal bodies. Among major recommendations of the Commission were:

A. *Responsibilities and Ethics*

i. that legislation be introduced to define in detail the role of public officers,

ii. that a code of ethics be drawn up for the adherence of civil servants,

iii. that senior civil servants should make a full statement of their interests,

iv. that permanent secretaries should delegate more routine matters,

v. that the minority of ineffective officers should be retired or appropriately regraded (a tribunal with the Chairman of the PSC associated therewith might be set up to examine the situation and make recommendations),

vi. that an Ombudsman be created with wide powers to investigate allegations of abuse by public servants.

B. *Gradings and Salaries*

vii. that professional staff salaries be upgraded,

viii. that the general level of salary increases should be c. 4 per cent, but the minimum salary of £78 p.a. be raised to £120,

ix. that substantial increases be paid to Under Secretaries upwards, including the Civil Service head and the Chief Justice.

x. that salary scales be rationalized and fixed salaries replaced by incremental scales,

xi. that officers with accumulated leave be allowed to commute up to half of it in cash,

xii. that the Public Service Commission should have an inspection unit to ensure consistent compliance with standards,

xiii. that a new post of district development officer be created responsible for rural development matters at district level under the DC,

xiv. that the Wamalwa Committee should consider training matters in depth,

xv. that major reform be undertaken of the education structure and teaching service,

xvi. that the rationalization of para-statal bodies be undertaken and that unofficial representation exceed that of officials on statutory Boards and that Board directors be trusted to get on with their roles without the exercise of undue official control. Allowances for Board mention should be between £6 and £8 per sitting,

xvii. that there should be a single tier system of local authorities (municipalities, Township authorities, County Councils). The DC *ex officio* to be the only non-elected member of local authorities. A single policy committee to replace functional standing committees. Mayors and Chairmen to be appointed by the Minister from a panel of names submitted by Councillors. The staff of the Ministry of Local Government to be strengthened, that Graduated Personal Tax be returned to County Councils. Deficiency grants be paid to balance Ministry approved budgets. Improved site value rating be introduced. A Local Government Service Commission be set up with wide powers over appointments and term of service, etc. Area and Urban Councils to be absorbed by County Councils.

KENYA – *Training Review*

Report of the Training Review Committee, 1971/72*

The Wamalwa Committee was given broad terms of reference within which to deal with the problem of civil service training in Kenya. The Committee was the direct outcome of the Ndegwa report which had considered the structure and remuneration of the Public Service.

Central and local government, para-statal bodies, the teaching service were all included in the definition of the public service followed by the Committee.

The summary of the main recommendations included, *inter alia*,

i. That categorized projections for manpower requirements at least up to the end of the decade should be developed.

ii. That the educational system should be fully geared to the country's manpower requirements with emphasis on technical, commercial and agricultural subjects.

iii. That the University must apply its knowledge to national effectiveness and decide its priorities in research, teaching and extension work accordingly.

iv. That there should be professional Training Officers in every Ministry and Provincial headquarters.

v. That sufficient numbers of Kenyan trainers be systematically developed.

vi. That all training must show an appropriate cost/benefit ratio.

vii. That there should be a national body responsible for the co-ordination of all training activities.

Training for the Common Cadres

viii. That the Ndegwa Commission's recommendations that the Government Secretarial Colleges should be taken over by the Ministry of Education should be implemented as soon as possible;

that there should be more rigid control over private secretarial colleges;

that a pilot project should be run at the KIA to help bosses make optimum use of secretarial services.

**Government Printer, Nairobi*, 1972; with appendices, pp. 136; Shs (K) 12.50.

Training for the Engineering and Building Industries

ix. That the Government of Kenya should enter into a fresh agreement with the ILO for continued assistance to the NIVTC.

x. That, as soon as practicable, the Technical Teacher Training programme be changed to produce technical teachers with practical experience.

xi. That efforts be made to overcome the delays in the recruitment of technical assistance trainers for the technical teachers training programme;
that care be taken that such technical assistance fits into the basic pattern of education in Kenya;
that adequate funds for this programme be provided.

Other Specialist Training

xii. That the Ministry of Agriculture should be provided with reliable manpower projections on which to base its training programmes;
that, as a temporary measure, the proportion of foreign students admitted to Egerton College should be increased.

xiii. That in the training and retraining of agricultural extension staff special emphasis should be given to the skills of communications;
that the Ministry should develop local training materials.

xiv. That the co-operative training at present carried out at the KIA be moved to the Co-operative College at Langata with all possible speed in accordance with Government's stated policy, except that basic induction in Government administration should still be given at the KIA.

xv. That the scheme for training regional specialists in the Foreign Service, under discussion between the Ministry and the University of Nairobi, should be introduced.

xvi. That intensive courses in Kiswahili should be introduced for civil servants.

xvii. That workers' education should be handled by COTU(K) with continued assistance from the Ministry of Labour and the FKE.

Training for Management

xviii. That a Committee on Entrepreneurial Development be set up to co-ordinate the activities of bodies involved in the training of African entrepreneurs.

xix. That the Management Training & Advisory Centre, to be renamed the Business Promotion and Advisory Centre, should drop its other functions and concentrate on the development of the small scale African entrepreneur;
that responsibility for the Centre should be transferred from the Ministry of Labour to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

xx. That the interchangeability between the Provincial Administration and the Central Administrative Service should be formalized.

The Staffing and Financing of Training

xxi. That the practice of adding the responsiblity for training to the schedule of duties of any official should cease;
that full-time professional Training Officers should be appointed.

xxii. That the fullest use should be made of local facilities to train trainers;
that a national policy and programme for the training of trainers should be developed;
that advantage should also be taken of outside programmes that are available.

xxiii. That there should be a planned career structure for trainers;
that the establishment of training institutions should be flexible to permit the appointment of experienced senior officers on short term assignments.

BRITAIN – *Studies of British Aid*

ODI has obtained a grant from the Social Science Research Council for research on British aid to Malawi and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. These studies are intended to represent the beginning of a series with the following objectives:

(a) To describe and assess the contribution of Britain's bilateral aid programme to the development of the countries concerned.

(b) To bring out the lessons for British aid policy in those countries.

(c) To help to understand the common and the differing features of developing countries as they relate to overall British aid policy.

A steering committee, with members from the academic, official and business worlds, is being set up to consider and advise on the programme. Its chairman will be Professor Ian Little, Professor of the Economics of Underdeveloped Countries at Oxford University and an ODI Council member.

SIERRA LEONE – *Local Government*

All District Councils will be suspended from 1st January, 1972. A statement issued by the Ministry of the Interior said that for many years the councils had been losing funds through misappropriation; reports of the Auditor-General on the accounts of the councils had been most discouraging. Their functions would now be performed partly by local authorities in each district, and partly by Ministries and departments of the Central Government under the control of a committee for each district composed of Government officers, local officials, and parliamentary representatives of the district.

Source: *West Africa, April,* 1972

BRITAIN – *Conference on "Development of the Land Law in Some Countries of the Commonwealth"*

A very successful conference on "Development of the Land Law in some Countries of the Commonwealth" was held under the auspices of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor Great Park, during the week-end of 21st to 23rd April, 1972.

The conference was opened on Friday, 21st April, by the Rt. Hon. Lord Cross, a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, and Chairman of the Comparative Law Section of the British Institute, who gave a short introductory address, and then took the Chair for the session that followed at which a lecture was given by Mr. S. Rowton Simpson, former Land Tenure Adviser Foreign and Commonwealth Office, on "Land Law and Registration of Title in Developing Countries".

Proceedings on the second day began with an address by the Rt. Hon. Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, followed by a session at which he took the Chair when a paper was read by Mr. R. S. Gae, Law Secretary of the Ministry of Law and Justice of the Government of India. Next came a paper read by Mr. P. J. Grimes, Property Law Revision Officer of the State of New South Wales, on "The Torrens System and Strata Titles", the Chairman at this session being the Rt. Hon. Sir Victor Windeyer, formerly a Justice of the High Court of Australia.

In the afternoon Mr. Justice Aubrey Fraser, a Justice of the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago, read a paper on "Developments in Land Law in the West Indies". The Chairman at this session was Professor O. R. Marshall, Vice-Chancellor of the University of the West Indies. In the evening, papers were read by Professor B. O. Nwabueze, Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Zambia, and Mr. C. M. McDowell, Lecturer in Law at the University of Birmingham, on "The Right of Occupancy System", the Chairman being Mr. H. H. Marshall, Q.C., Deputy Director of the British Institute.

On the morning of the third day a paper was read by Professor Joshua Weisman of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, on "The Land Law, 1969, of Israel", the Chairman being Mr. Theodore B. F. Ruoff, Chief Land Registrar of England. The paper to be presented was read by Mr. G. W. Kanyeihamba, Senior Lecturer, Makerere University, Uganda, and Visiting Fellow of the University of Warwick on "Urban Land Planning and the Land Law in East Africa with special reference to Kampala City". This was followed by a general discussion session at which all the Conference papers were considered and questions on them put and answered. At both these sessions the Chairman was Mr. S. Rowton Simpson.

Among those present, in addition to those specially mentioned above, were Mr. J. C. D. Lawrance, Land Tenure Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Mr. N. L. Vaidyanathan, Legal Adviser to the High Commission of India in the United Kingdom, Mr. G. Ellenbogen, Barrister-at-Law and Director of the Friends of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Dr. Simon Roberts, Lecturer in Law, London School of Economics, University of London and Mr. K. G. Philip, Research Officer of the British Institute. There were present altogether twenty-seven senior guests. Thirty students accepted invitations, but owing to the "go-slow" on the British Railway system, not all these were present all of the time. Of the thirty, five were from Nigeria, four from Uganda, two each from Australia, India, Jamaica, Malaysia and Trinidad, and one each from Barbados, British Honduras, Cameroun, Canada, Guyana, Hong Kong, Kenya, Pakistan, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Zambia.

Book Reviews

Adult Education and Nation Building, Ed. JOHN LOWE; *Edinburgh University Press;* pp. 258; £2.50.

This is a symposium edited and introduced by Professor John Lowe, Director of the Department of Adult Education at Edinburgh University. It contains eleven studies written by Adult Educators about their own countries or about countries and regions in which they have worked. The editor calls it "a modest contribution to the beginnings of comparative studies". This is too modest a claim. It is in fact a most useful "map" of adult education, and perhaps the first of its kind. As the publisher's note claims, "it will be of value both to practising adult educators and to the growing band of students engaged in the academic study of adult education".

I think it was a pity that the editor uses his introduction to take so many swipes at the previous literature and at the "agencies producing facts and figures" about adult education – methods of collecting data which are "conspicuously unscientific" – "The awesome gap between aspiration and reality" – "elaborate window dressing" and finally the "semantic muddle and confusion that reigns about the meaning of adult education". These complaints are real but rather rash for they raise our expectations. Will we at last have reliable facts and figures? Will we have data that are "scientifically collected"? Will the gap between aspiration and reality be closed? Above all will the semantic muddle be straightened out? The answers are unfortunately and, perhaps inevitably, "no".

As a first solution to the semantic muddle he offers us a very formal definition, coined by the International Congress of University Adult Education. It defines adult education as "a process whereby persons who *no longer attend school* . . . undertake sequential and organized activities with a conscious intention of bringing about changes in information, knowledge, understanding or skills, appreciation and attitudes . . ." Does that adequately describe, say, Agricultural Extension, which is one of the most vital services of "non-formal" adult education in rural areas? And in any country where half the adult population has never been inside a school, that "no longer" must have an ironic ring. "The semantic muddle", says the editor, "is further complicated by the fact that many activities palpably concerned with the education of adults are neither acknowledged as such nor carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of Education". What Ministry, if any, should be responsible for adult education is not only a semantic but also an organizational problem, and I for one would be happier that it should not be the Ministry of Education, which in most countries is a "Ministry of Schools" and a very conservative branch of the Civil Service.

But what of the individual contributions? Are the facts scientifically collected? Is there a clear distinction between aspiration and reality? Well, not really; but they are honest subjective reports by experienced adult educators with personal knowledge of the situations they describe. Most of them contain the usual lists of administrative functions, resolutions, aims and aspirations – "the four sections of the Division perform the following specific functions . . ." (35 functions are then listed from the Philippines): "the resolution reads . . ." (South Pacific): "the department should . . ." (West Indies). In all these details of aims and organizations it is sometimes difficult to discover who has learned what from whom and with what results. This, I suppose, is inevitable until objective evaluation is incorporated into adult education; and, of course, as the introduction indicates, objective evaluation is difficult and expensive, and often unwelcome.

Window dressing? Yes, some of that, too, but not much. It is noticeable that the hardest hitting and most searching and critical accounts are often written by nationals of the countries described. Some of the "expatriates" have inevitably felt a little more constrained to flattery. Is the "functional job-oriented literacy programme" in Kenya really "proving very successful"? Has the Board of Adult Education, which aims to solve the problem of interdepartmental collaboration, really "begun operating in the manner intended?" Is the extra-mural department in Ghana really "re-stabilised in relation to educational philosophy, social realities and programming"? A very large part of its activity seems to be engaging secondary school teachers to give remedial G.C.E. classes to those who have missed the school bus. This may be adjusting to social pressures but it is debatable whether it is good educational philosophy or the best use of a University in adult education.

The introduction gives us a complicated rationalisation for the choice of countries and areas studied. The reasons for including six out of eleven from Africa and excluding the Arab world are not very convincing. And why not Israel? And Cuba? In any study of the role of adult education in nation building both of these would have had something original to contribute. However, the book makes no claim to world coverage and the reader has no right to complain, for it is a valuable study of how adult education operates in eleven parts of the world by eleven well-informed people, who write about it in very readable style.

One feature which caught my personal fancy was the twelve page concluding chapter, called "Convergences", by Alan Thomas, Director of the Canadian Association of Adult Education. First he questions the values inherent in current philosophies of development and then launches a sharp attack on the formal education set-up – the "creation of vast public educational administrative systems" with their "vigorous separation of children from parents", and their "destruction of any continuity in learning and consequently in living". The concept of "continuing education" he sees as a "frail if determined effort" to combat these tendencies.

Finally he proposes to "dismiss the term 'adult education', at least temporarily, and fall back on the more fundamental and genuine activity or function, namely, 'learning' ". Learning, as he says, far exceeds the limits of education. How right he is! I see it as almost synonymous with development. Starting, perhaps, as a spontaneous response to experience in the struggle for survival – as adaptation to the raw environment and to unforeseen change – it evolves with the individual and society into a more conscious search for understanding and for the prediction and control of change until eventually it gives access to the spiritual and material rewards of development and to an enhancement of the quality of life. And education, perhaps most of all adult education, as Alan Thomas says, is a "support for learning" – "a humane and unquestioned value for any society to pursue".

So here for £2.50, in a hard back edition, with a useful bibliography and a well arranged index, Dr. Lowe and the Edinburgh University Press have given us eleven informative and stimulating accounts of adult education, seen as a support for development. Certainly an opportune contribution to the Second Development Decade.

JOHN BOWERS

A Gust of Plumes: a biography of Lord Twining of Godalming and Tanganyika, by DARRELL BATES; *London, Hodder & Stoughton*, 1972; pp. 319; £2.95.

Perhaps some day there will be a "Twining industry" as there has been a "Hobbes industry", a "Lugard industry", a "Gandhi industry", and so on. Probably all who knew Twining would feel that "Twiningology" deserves a run; and this book can serve very well as hare for the hounds. Its enormous virtue is that it tries to "see Twining whole". Perhaps by the end of it we are a little tired of Twining's family connections and Twining's childhood: even of Twining's correspondence with his mother (she died at 89 in 1962, and the correspondence continued till her death). But the author is absolutely right in purpose in trying to show us the unity of a life which touched so many of us in short episodes.

Something, it seems to me, is still missing; or perhaps "*A Gust of Plumes*" gives the wrong impression. What amazed and really dazzled me in my own brief acquaintance with Twining was that (as now so clearly appears) he had climbed the ladder the hard way, with no family influence, no war record, no academic record; yet rejoiced to "take the mickey" out of everything within reach, starting with himself, Government House, and all the apparatus of "prancing pro-consul". I had the benefit of this, and so had the editor of this journal who also "edited" the "Mackenzie report" of 1952; and I don't think we appreciated any compliment more than his side-of-the-mouth admission, to the effect that he had got more out of it than he ever thought he would.

Twining comes through in this account as a "funny man" in all possible senses, "an odd ball"; but not perhaps sufficiently as a mocker, for whom mockery was a tool of his trade.

Was there a holy place in which he did not mock? The author suggests that there was; that he took wholly seriously the other initiates of his craft, the administrative service and the "native chiefs". And he links this to the question of Twining's acceptance of two last years in Tanganyika, from 1956 to June, 1958, and the supposed misjudgements and mishaps of that period.

This is well worth arguing about, as a piece of history, quite apart from the poetic impulse of the historian to round off a meteoric career with a touch of sadness and decline. About various things there really can be no dispute. Twining made Tanganyika an important place, virtually out of nothing. Twining, by hospitality and mockery, made people talk, drew into his queer sort of "court politics" people who would never have tangled with any other sort of politics. And he handed on this inheritance of people and talk to another man who also loves them, though in a different fashion, Julius Nyerere.

A failure at the end? Well, the United Tanganyika Party, the Governor's Party, became a bit of a joke; but it had achieved "mobilization", in the sociological sense, both by recruitment and by reaction of a kind not imaginable even five years before. A House of Chiefs? A non-starter? Or the only African alternative to TANU, and therefore a necessary question to pose and answer?

Twining's mockery and self-mockery had many twists in it which I could not follow. But he never seemed to me to be a cunning or devious man in policy, and it is not too much to say that he devised a scenario which worked out just right for Sir Richard Turnbull and Julius Nyerere in relation to the development of Tanganyika and its influence on developments in East and Central Africa. Name no names; but how much easier a legacy than those in Uganda, Kenya, Central Africa?

Conspiracy theories of history won't do, even for a conspiracy of one, Twining conspiring with himself. But I think history might at least claim him as accomplice.

Two sets of facts.

Firstly, this book makes it clear by direct quotation from private letters where he stood on two issues he could approach in public only by mockery.

One of them was his attitude to claims for white supremacy. Here are some of his notes on the state of unofficial European leadership in Tanganyika, as he saw it in his first encounter with the Northern Province Council, precursor of the Tanganyika European Council (p. 221) . . . "Politics seem to be a profitable outlet for bad farmers" . . . "It would have been difficult for them to have made a worse presentation of such case as they had" . . . "the standard-bearers of European civilization" . . . "a general apathy towards politics".

In fact, he mobilized better Europeans, whose work has been valuable even to this day; but clearly he had no taste for double talk and double think – partnership to him did not mean "white man's country" as it did at that time in Central Africa.

The book also makes it clear that he saw South Africa above all as alien, hostile and to be resisted: "an arid inhospitable land inhabited by people whose outlook is foreign to ours and who dislike or despise everything we prize . . . I shall be glad to get back to my own stamping ground where our standards are so much more simple" (p. 229). And of Southern Rhodesia (p. 272): "we (i.e. Lady Twining and himself) do not approve of the policy there and the landscape is ugly".

It was not his way to wave a flaming sword or to declaim about eternal principles, but clearly he, too, saw the 1950's as a frontier war; how far south could we push the frontiers of civilization? We have been beaten, it seems, between Limpopo and Zambesi but have held the Zambesi line, once precarious: and to this he contributed.

The second line of evidence concerns the de Stapledon Committee on electoral qualifications, two of whose meetings I attended as consultant in 1956. This was on the face of it a case of a good* Chief Secretary tidying up business for the boss; but it came to rather more than that. On the one hand, the ideology of common roll was official doctrine; but the committee could not fail to see that in Tanganyika common roll meant African majority, because no amount of ingenuity (however Rhodesian in its complexity) could argue away the fact that Europeans and Asians were negligible minorities in at least three-quarters of the country. On any franchise at all, however restricted, territorial constituencies plus common roll would be equivalent to African decision.

I think that this was perfectly clear to the Committee, and that it drew the logical conclusion – why then fuss over a very narrow and balanced definition of the franchise?

The other side of the story is that in that period in 1956 Page-Jones, then Member for Local Government, lent me his house for a long session of talk with Julius Nyerere and a cross-section of the TANU leadership (from young University boys to Swahili elders) and I did my best, through barriers of language and culture, to state the same argument there; that there was no catch in it, that if TANU fought on common roll the decision would lie with African voters.

At the same time, in more alcoholic settings (though there was also a very good TANU party, green togas and all), I did what I could to say to UTP people, Europeans and Asians, that as things were going these would be in the last resort African elections; their tactics must be to bid for African support. (There was in Tanganyika then, seconded from Conservative headquarters as UTP organizer, Mr. Brian Willis; and to him I told the same story. No comment from him.)

On that occasion, I was in no sense "the governor's stooge", as someone kindly (and rightly) said of me in 1952. But I can't believe that Twining was unaware of the drift of the argument and its consequences, and indeed it was in the last resort he who endorsed territorial constituencies and common roll, with a pretty generous franchise.

In that context, his choice of "chiefs against TANU" makes political sense, in that it shifted the emphasis from multiracialism, which the Africans clearly did not want, as a matter of political power, to the question of what kind of African rule Africans did want. (Incidentally, it *is* important not by hindsight to see this as a one-way choice. There were chiefs as caricatured by TANU, beery, elderly and illiterate: there were also modernizing chiefs, such as Kidaha Makwaia, Adam Sapi, Fundikira, Thomas Marealle (some good, some not so good) and it was less than ten years since the Wachagga, one of the most lively of peoples, had positively, even violently demanded the perpetuation and strengthening of the institution). Of course there was sentiment in it, and irony: but there was also rationality, in that it posed for African choice the only issue on which there was African opinion, one way or the other, throughout the diverse tribes and settlements of Tanganyika: self-appointed leaders or traditional ones? The choice was made explicitly, and is in one sense irreversible. But there is still very little in the research reports to tell us pragmatically how matters go in the Districts between black administrative officers, the internal politics of tribes, and the TANU "young men".

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*Perhaps better than good; anyone interested in long range forecasting about development should look at his article entitled East Africa in 1979 in the East African Economics Review for January, 1955.

The speed with which Nyerere created a successful TANU out of a moribund African Association was unexpected to everyone – from Governor downwards; equally unexpected was the sustained growth of the Party without any of the set-backs likely had financial muddling led to positive and major fraud. It was some time before it was fully appreciated that Nyerere recognized this danger and was also capable of keeping it within some sort of reasonable bounds. Touches of Tammany Hall tactics were not wanting, particularly up-country, but these were never condoned in any way by the party's founder at headquarters.

Twining might not expect TANU leaders to decline a gin at GH on a matter of principle but he would readily have mocked himself for want of foresight. One can be blinded by the speed of events after his departure, up till then despite the breakdown in his relations with TANU he could still walk unguarded – just as his successor walked and cycled – through crowds who wished him no ill and who respected his unmistakable stature.

W. J. M. Mackenzie

South Asia's Economy in the 1970s, *Asian Development Bank, Longman,* 1971, Appendices, pp. 516; £8.00.

The Asian Development Bank agreed to organize a study of the factors which would have an important bearing on economic conditions in the region during the 1970s, in response to a request at the fourth Ministerial Conference for Economic Development of Southeast Asia. This book is the result. It consists of an overall report by Professor Myint, which draws heavily on the individual reports, though it is not a summary and does not agree with them in all details. In addition there are individual reports on the Green Revolution (Harry Walters and Joseph Willet), the Manufacturing Industry Sector (Helen Hughes), Foreign Economic Relations (Kiyoshi Kojina, Saburo Okita and Peter Drysdale), the Impact of Foreign Private Investment (Dirk U Stikker with Ryokichi Hirono) and Population (Yon Poh Seng and Stephen Yeh). The real meat is contained in these individual reports (though doubtless Myint's introduction will receive most attention, since it is also being published separately as a Penguin). Between them the 600-plus pages and 160-plus tables of the individual reports contain almost blitz-like coverage of the region, and will provide invaluable source material for future analyses.

There was obviously little attempt to co-ordinate the individual reports, and there is some overlap. But sharing similar backgrounds (it is significant that all except for the authors of the population section come from developed capitalist countries), points of view and assumptions, they come to similar conclusions. The overall picture is one of qualified optimism: the Green Revolution will release land and resources for other uses; reorientation of policy (by removal of tariffs, etc.) away from the now widely condemned import substitution syndrome towards export orientation, both of a supply based nature (processing of raw materials) and a demand based nature (providing labour intensive goods and components for developed countries), combined with the active encouragement of private foreign investment will enable the economies of Southeast Asia to follow the precedents of Taiwan, South Korea, and now Singapore in achieving a rapid rate of industrialization and growth of G.D.P. Southeast Asia may thus provide further vindication of development based on private (largely foreign) ownership. As the section on foreign private investment argues:

> "The country studies demonstrate a salient feature of economic progress in Southeast Asia. The most rapid economic growth in the 1960s took place in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand . . . In these countries the Government gave the private sector the greatest encouragement to take part in the development process." (p. 428)

The success and desirability of such a pattern of development can be questioned from many points of view. In the context of this study there are two aspects of the proposed strategy which cause particular concern, and which deserve far more attention than they get. First, the optimistic approach to the Green Revolution: many observers[1] have pointed out the technological, economic and social dangers which may, unless counteracted, threaten any development based on it. Because of the need for access to irrigation, fertilizer, and hence credit, if the potential offered by the new seeds is to be exploited, the benefits of the revolution tend to be confined to the larger farmers, while the small farmers lose income, employment and ultimately land in the face of this competition. "The Green Revolution belongs to the 'Kulaks'," according to one observer[2]. The ADB study makes only passing reference to income distribution effects, and avoids the issue of how such effects may be counteracted, which should be central to a discussion of the possibility of stable development based on the Green Revolution. Secondly, in almost every section, the book illustrates and demonstrates the increasing economic hegemony of Japan: and its own strategy – of free trade and encouraging private overseas investment – will itself massively increase, and indeed is only possible with, such hegemony. In 1971 Japan took 21 per cent of all Southeast Asian exports and supplied 28.3 per cent of her imports. By 1980 Japan is expected to provide a market for over half of the region's exports. The growing market dependence is paralleled by a rising share of industry owned by Japan. At the moment 10 per cent of foreign investment in Indonesia and Malaysia and about a quarter in Thailand is in Japanese hands. But the logic of the policy of encouraging private foreign investment, combined with the rapid growth of the Japanese economy, the Japanese aid policy of maintaining a large proportion of her contribution to the UNCTAD target in the form of private flows, and the likely withdrawal of American influence, will be to raise these proportions rapidly. Growing dependence on Japan has one obvious advantage for the region: it provides opportunities and resources unparalleled outside Asia. But it also contains dangers: obvious risks of instability if the Japanese economic miracle comes to an end, or is diverted, for ecological or other reasons, which some observers now think a possibility; secondly, the risks of political domination, inevitable in the context of such economic domination. The price, political and economic, may in the end prove too high and it may then appear that the structure of development proposed in this book contains contradictions which may ultimately endanger it.

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[1] In, for example, C. R. Wharton, "The Green Revolution; Cornucopia or Pandora's Box" *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1969, and T. J. Byres, "The Dialectic of India's Green Revolution", *South Asian Review*, January, 1972.

[2] J. P. Lewis, "Wanted in India: A Relevant Radicalism", *Economic and Political Weekly*, July, 1970.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that parts of the Report are wishful thinking – what the authors and the ADB would like to see rather than what is most likely to happen. This is perhaps clearest in the section on Vietnam, which assumes that the war ends in 1973 with a U.S. victory, the U.S. then withdraws, leaving only "low level insurgency" and peaceful development then begins. In the light of the N. Vietnamese onslaught in April/May, 1972, the scenario appears absurd. The ADB does not justify it but says the assumptions were chosen on "formal hypothetical grounds": that only with this sequence of events could the ADB study the implications for the region. But for a study of this kind the implications for the region of (a) escalation, (b) victory for the North, since they, too, are possibilities, are also relevant to a survey of developments in the seventies. However, despite the odd set of assumptions the section contains a good deal of great interest. It is shown that between 1964 and 1967 civilian GNP fell slightly, but consumption rose by over 2 per cent p.a. in real terms (and investment by 10 per cent p.a.), while the import surplus rose to 15 per cent of GNP. It is believed that the US contribution (excluding military aid) may have been equal to one-third of GNP in 1969. "After a while, such a system develops strong vested interests in the continuation of the system by those who have learned how to use it and have developed the necessary connections" (p. 598). In 1969 S. Vietnam received p. capita non-military aid of £27.3, compared with £3.2 aid per head received in the rest of Southeast Asia from *all* sources between 1966/68. Poor recompense for the hardships engendered by 25 years of war, but a significant indicator of how US aid is distributed.

FRANCES STEWART

Behavioural Change in Agriculture, Edited by J. PAUL LEAGANS and CHARLES P. LOOMIS, *Cornell University Press*, 1971; £5.95.

This large volume consists of papers written by a number of distinguished scholars for a Seminar at Cornell University, and directed to the problems of social and attitudinal change involved in the modernization of agricultural systems in developing countries.

To do justice to the many and complex ideas put forward in these papers would require half the space in this Journal, and also risk distortion through compression. All that can be attempted is to describe, also at risk, the *kind* of book it is, so that readers who are interested can read it for thesmelves.

Essentially it is a book describing the kind of social change, the kind of methods of communication, the kind of infrastructural investment which would ideally be necessary to secure the acceptance and use of more productive agricultural technologies and a more highly commercialized agricultural industry. The Extension officer is usually described as "the agent of change", and perhaps this gives one hint of the general drive of these papers. On the whole, and with exceptions in some Papers, it is a theoretical rather than an administrator's book: this, or that, should be done. In consequence, it not infrequently gets too near the position of the wise owl who, as a consultant, advised a mouse to grow wings, but refused to say how to do it, since he dealt only with policy.

For, more seriously, a given society, be it Turkey, or Upper Volta, or Colombia, has only certain real possibilities, and a certain possible style of social action. If such a society had a powerful, well-trained, honest, and coordinated administration, much of what is recommended could be done. If it had, centrally and locally, politicians devoted to policies rather than to personal or class power; landlords devoted to agricultural intensification; freedom of expression and organization among literate citizens; research workers devoted to solving practical farming problems rather than the hopes of a Professorship . . .

This is not to say that definition of ideal goals and of tasks, even if they cannot immediately be achieved, is useless. On the contrary, it may be useful wherever, even in one aspect of a country's effort, there is real goodwill and an honest endeavour for development; for it will warn against mistakes and misapprehensions which have defeated sincere intentions in the past. But in real life the patient business of agricultural development is more often the endeavour to use weak tools, to circumvent political and social obstacles rather than wish them away, to give to farmers certain raw opportunities, to watch how these are used, and abused, in the actual social system, to control and amend abuses as they arise. Can you get on without Land Reform, if Land Reform is politically impossible? Can you get on without Subsidised Credit? Is the best technical solution the enemy of the fairly good one? Is the centrally devised Cotton Scheme one which farmers can use and are willing to use? If the Extension staff cannot reach the farmers, can the farmers reach an Extension centre?

In a more generalized sense, do not Papers of this kind, often impeccable in logic and recommendation, too often wish away the real societies to which they refer, in order to say "This is what we, a developed country, would do if we had control"? It is sometimes easy to see this happening in donor projects. When I.B.R.D. moves into Malawi and sets one District to rights, what is to happen to the rest of Malawi, when the Bank has gone?

It is not only theoretical books which leave so many problems unsolved. The gap between recommendation and implementation remains wide even with more applied work. More unsecured crop season credit for farmers with smaller acreages is recommended by a recent, very practical report on Agricultural Inputs in Kenya. Splendid. But what agency is to give it to tens of thousands of small farmers, at what administrative cost, and how is it to be recovered, and, if it is not, how to avoid the belief that government loans need not be repaid?

Modern sociology and "diffusion theory" is given to lengthy abstract argument and words, such as "empathy", which one hopes, rather than believes, are closely defined. It may be reaching profound theoretical conclusions which one day will be translated to practical use. Certainly, this book, both in style and in applicability, is two steps, rather than one, from such a consummation, devoutly though it be wished.

GUY HUNTER

Land Planning by Administrative Regulation: The Policies of the Ontario Municipal Board, by GERALD M. ADLER; *Oxford University Press*; £6.00.

Gerald Adler has made a novel analytical study of the attitudes and decisions of a particular public authority – the Ontario Municipal Board, in the discharge of its responsibilities as an appellate tribunal supervising the public control of land use. The Ontario Municipal Board is a Canadian public authority of long-standing with a worthy record running back to 1906, long before Government was actively engaged in land use control. The Board functions as an intermediary between the provincial Ministry of Municipal Affairs and the nine hundred and sixty six Municipal Councils of the province.

The author sets out to identify, analyse and enumerate the differing criteria which have influenced the decisions of the Board over the years 1964/66, with material gleaned from 1967 thrown in for good measure. Mr. Adler is a far-sighted and shrewd lawyer – an expert in land planning legislation. His scholarship, innate wisdom and sure judgement are manifest and the better displayed when, in the concluding chapter (Appraisal and Conclusions), he gets away from pedantic counting of times and occasions and relies upon his own understanding of the application of the law and upon the penetrating insights borne of practice, knowledge and pragmatic wisdom.

The main text of the book is a sacrifice of a fine intellect to the modern loch, the computer, insatiable of facts made digestible by forcing human judgements into crude classifications to be enumerated, measured and classified. It is as if the means justified the ends; so long as an author can "quantify" his information, however purposelessly and roughly, he is accepted among the worshippers to be a modern scholar indeed.

What an earlier wisdom and ready understanding would have regarded as issues determining the purpose and content of the cases brought before the Ontario Municipal Board, Mr. Adler designates "variables" in deference to the shibboleths of the computer code. He lays the judgements of the Board on a Procrustean bed and forces them to fit a rough-hewn series of what he calls "phrases"; for example, "needs for services"; "nature and quality of the area". Each phrase actually used or implied by the use of appropriate words is then counted among the decisions of the Board. The figures are arranged in a series of Tables to show the incidence of the phrases as they occur in decisions concerning:

(a) comprehensive by-laws;
(b) the amendment of by-laws;
(c) the sub-division of plan references.

The whole range of evidence so analysed is repeated under three heads:

(1) maintenance of environmental amenities;
(2) integrity of the by-law;
(3) land use allocation.

The up-shot is certainly a novel set of figures and Tables – it is also a display of great patience and meticulous counting, but to what end? In the concluding chapter the author tries to answer this question by using the sifted evidence to provide a code of reference to the attitudes of the Board for the future guidance of practitioners. The code tends to read like a horoscope, full of warnings and assured hopes. It is too emphatic in its assertions – e.g. "Insufficient prior consultation by the municipality with affected persons in the area *will* affect the attitude of the Board negatively". The author, subservient as he is to the dictates of the computer, is given to stating certainties which rest only upon an analysis of past actions. He assumes that past decisions are near-certain precedents for future attitudes and gives no place to changes in the membership of the Ontario Municipal Board or in its political allegiances. A similar exercise in the analysis of decisions taken by local authorities in Britain would undoubtedly vary in its conclusions with the political outlook of the majorities. Surely Canadian local affairs are not above the political.

As hinted earlier, the best passages in the book, those which are the most illuminating and therefore the most rewarding and in the bargain the most readable, give the author's commentaries and observations on the attitudes of the Ontario Municipal Board as he has formed them during the course of his statistical exercise but without the aid of his head-counters and the computer.

As an interesting attempt to mechanise human judgements the book is well worth studying; as a guide to practitioners and those who must think, work and act in the world of real men, keep to the wisdom of the author as displayed in the last chapter.

D. R. DENMAN

Rulers of Empire; The French Colonial Service in Africa, by William B. Cohen; *Hoover Institution Press, USA,* 1971; pp. 279; US$9.50.

In presenting a detailed study on the history and growth of the French colonial service in West Africa from its beginnings to the independence of the francophone territories, Professor William B. Cohen has accomplished a very worthwhile piece of research for all English-speaking readers interested in the development of Africa South of the Sahara. There is unfortunately a lamentable dearth of studies in depth on the French tradition in Africa by English writers. This has been due largely to the language barrier, but it has been made doubly difficult for the anglophone researcher by the differences in attitude and approach to overseas administration adopted by metropolitan France from those practised in the British colonies. To a British administrator in a West African colony the French-speaking dependencies of the A.O.F. were characterised by a policy of assimilation with France and by a uniformity of administration which allowed a free movement of officials throughout the French empire. Small wonder that the British District Officer, dedicated to a single colony for the whole of his career and to the development of indigenous cultures and administrations failed to appreciate the problems of his counterpart across the border or to study French colonial administration. Few French Officials spoke English at all and most British administrators spoke only schoolboy French. This failure to understand each other and to communicate on matters of common need promoted suspicion and in retrospect appears to have proved a great disservice to Africa. It has opened rifts between communities of the same ethnic roots which will take generations to close and it has made the unification of West Africa economically and socially so much more difficult to accomplish.

It would have been relatively simple for Professor Cohen to have limited himself to a study of the policies and doctrine issued by Paris and the *Ecole Coloniale.* Such an approach, however, would have resulted in a sterile, surgical study of development and change in the colonial era. An examination of the men who administered the Empire and of their strengths and weaknesses, however, has added immeasurably to the quality of the work. In addition to critical studies of such influences as those of Maurice Delafosse or Robert Delavignette, Professor Cohen has circularized as many ex-French colonial officials, both French and African, as possible by detailed questionnaire. Their answers have provided the human touch that brings to the work the same standard of credibility and atmosphere as that found in Woodruff's "The Guardians".

The criticism is apt and unbiased – supported by a wealth of documentary evidence, the humane, the weak, the brutal and the brilliant pass in fascinating review. The French colonial administrator has gone, like his English counterpart, into history. A person of many roles – tax collector, judge, horse dealer, postman, builder, agriculturist, policeman, to name only a part of the list compiled by Delafosse – living often a lonely, uncomfortable life and burdened with heavy responsibilities, he is a subject worthy of the competent and unprejudiced biography that this work provides.

M. J. Campbell

Review 5; *Overseas Development Institute*, 1972; tables, appendices, glossary, index; pp. 140; £1.50.

Since one of the functions of the Overseas Development Institute is to keep the urgency of development issues and problems before the public and the responsible authorities, it may fairly be claimed that this latest review of British, American and Dutch development performance and policies is as good and sufficient discharge of this function as any subscriber could desire. But it is in the final chapter by Guy Hunter where the urgency of the issues is most clearly and forcefully depicted. The author matches Philippe de Seynes, Under-Secretary General for Economic and Social Affairs at the United Nations headquarters, with Professor Harry Johnson, of London University, and comes down unequivocally on the side of the Professor. Thus, de Seynes' "it is necessary to re-affirm that growth continues to be the mainspring of social progress and, in a sense, its guardian angel", is firmly rejected in favour of Johnson's "the essence of the development process is a process of social transformation which can only be effected by a myriad of micro-economic changes not simply by macro-economic additions of domestic and foreign resources. These changes have to be effected largely, if not exclusively, by the governments and citizens of developing countries themselves".

A lot of students of the development process would now be found to agree with Guy Hunter and would probably go further in concluding that the issue of principle is no longer in doubt. What is much more difficult is to translate the principle into effective aid policies. Country programming under the general control and direction of the UN Resident Representative may well constitute a small advance on the multi-lateral front. But a substantial change of attitude is clearly demanded of major bilateral donors if country programming, in their understanding of the term as defined in the earlier chapters of this Review, is to become sensitive to the social aspirations of developing countries particularly where these may appear to be in conflict with the donors' political and commercial criteria.

L.W.N.

Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations – a programme of action for Ceylon; *International Labour Office, Geneva;* Report of an Inter-Agency Team; pp. 251; £1.60. Technical Papers; pp. 251; £1.60.

The Inter-Agency team which studied the employment problems of Ceylon in 1971 was organized by the ILO and led by Dudley Seers (who headed the similar earlier team to Colombia). The report backed by a volume of technical papers makes stimulating reading.

Ceylon, with "fertile land, high rainfall, abundant forests, seas teeming with fish, precious stones, other valuable minerals . . . rich culture, long traditions of craftsmanship" . . .

Ceylon, with 10 per cent of its labour force unemployed (15 per cent in 1969/70), with youth hardest hit of all, 70 per cent or more of "O" level school leavers with no prospect of jobs – and, no less, a quarter of a million school leavers each year. Why this poverty of employment in an island so rich in natural resources?

Too much in the past had depended on tea – a crop in the post-independence era for which prices had been particularly variable, and with Tamil estate workers forming 25 per cent of the total Ceylon labour force. Tea profits had not expanded; a slow demand for tea and rubber.

A population growing at 2 per cent p.a. – to bring unemployment down to 5 per cent would mean a rise in employment opportunities of 3½ per cent p.a. – a serious balance of payment situation, policy inertia and the ever increasing number of jobless secondary school leavers. These were the main problems that the ILO team found. What recommendations were made to the Government of Ceylon? These included:

i. a more processed form of tree-crop exports (e.g. tea bags, crepe rubber coir fibre),

ii. remove subsidies encouraging the import of capital intensive machinery – favour labour intensive methods,

iii. synchronize construction work with seasonal agricultural activities,

iv. encourage labour intensive forms of agriculture,

v. use existing machinery more intensively,

vi. a radical land distribution, a rural works programme (irrigation schemes, etc.),

vii. on industry, apart from construction, few suggestions emerged,

viii. on labour, repatriation of 50,000 residents to India p.a. (rather than 15,000) would virtually resolve the whole rural unemployment problem *and* consequently improve wages and conditions for the remaining and indigenous labour force,

ix. on education, stop basic education at "O" level and let very few move onward and upward,

x. orient the administrative structure of government to planning and plan implementation needs – develop a flexible planning infrastructure (eleven specific recommendations are made in this field),

xi. organized schemes for youth – establish a national youth service wage scale with maximum wages based on age not education.

No doubt this is worth consideration and good luck to such a scheme were it to succeed – it does sound rather an Utopian one to expect man to respond to social stimuli minus the normally needed carrot. Many countries would watch an experiment on these lines with very great interest.

xii. As one would expect the team shows its expertise and perhaps to some extent its political thinking in the recommendations it makes for fiscal change and income and prices policy,

xiii. International Aid should concentrate on assistance over:

(a) short term debt;

(b) development capital;

(c) trade arrangements;

(d) technical assistance.

The team believes that these forms of aid added to tough measures by the Ceylon Government could show not only Ceylon but other governments as well, how to deal with chronic unemployment.

P.H.J.

Book Notes

Fifty Years of Commonwealth Economic Development, by AUSTIN ROBINSON; *Cambridge University Press;* pp. 31; 40p.

The honour of presenting the 1971 Smuts memorial lecture at Cambridge was the turn of a notable economist who takes his place worthily in the list of very distinguished lecturers upon whom this annual task has fallen.

Professor Robinson looks back over the 50 years during which he has been an active economist, straddling the era in which the new Commonwealth emerged out of the old. Professor Robinson also looks back at the preceding era when British power and influence was at its zenith, and great resources were utilised for overseas development. As he sees it, in the Nineteenth Century British investment enabled the old Commonwealth to "take-off into self-sustained growth", it went far towards generating economic development in Latin America and in less developed areas of Europe as well. Why, therefore, Professor Robinson asks, is it so difficult for Twentieth Century Britain to help the New Commonwealth likewise? He provides the answer: it is because the old Commonwealth needed capital only to spring ahead, *per capita* income was already higher than in Britain, today ldcs are deep in poverty; today Britain and others are faced with trying to aid the 700 millions of the Third World; the old Commonwealth in the Nineteenth Century numbered some eight million plus forty million in the USA; above all emphasis is laid on the domestic stagnation on the UK economic front which enabled Britain to do good by stealth. Now Professor Robinson wants Britain to provide leadership, to aid the new Commonwealth generously openly "as a deliberate act of policy".

A Year Book of the Commonwealth, 1972; *H.M. Stationery Office;* tables, appendices, index, map; pp. 821; £5.50.

For the public and the private sectors alike, in Britain and in all the countries of the Commonwealth, in the many government and commercial offices in foreign countries having dealings with the Commonwealth, this is an essential reference book for the office bookshelf, admirably produced by HMSO and modestly priced considering the wealth of information it contains which would cost much office time and money to seek elsewhere. For the general reader with an interest in Commonwealth affairs no other hand book provides such depth of knowledge.

Besides details of the Commonwealth Secretariat and regional organisations, particulars are provided of some 150 committees, societies and bodies in Britain with Commonwealth interests or links.

The world map published by the Directorate of Overseas Surveys is a model of its kind.

Technology for Freedom – Man in his environment; *ILO Geneva,* 1972; pp. 58, Frs (Swiss) 8.

With evangelical zeal the director-general of ILO preaches the gospel for an enlightened attitude towards technology. There is a very great deal of "must", "must", "must"; "can", "will", "where" proliferate. Yet this is the tub-thumping of almost the oldest of international agencies and not of some upstart new boy calling attention to himself. Nonetheless, despite the journalese, this short monograph carries a message of major substance – the importance of fostering technologies suitable for developing countries, and to this end the ILO's World Employment Programme can play an important role in the identification and application of technologies with a view to the provision of full employment and disseminating up-to-date knowledge in this field.

It is to be hoped that the director-general's enthusiasm will stimulate a reasonable measure of international response.

Literacy 1967/1969, *UNESCO – Paris;* tables and appendices; pp. 113.

This volume was published by UNESCO for the International Education Year (1970) and is a sequel to *Literacy* 1965-67, and provides a review of the world literacy situation.

The estimated drop in the global illiteracy rate in respect of adults during the Fifties is estimated as no more than 5 per cent. Of nineteen countries examined nine are shown with an *increased* percentage of illiterates during the decade.

UNESCO enquired of member states what they considered the most urgent problems now faced. The replies were almost unanimous, and the five major problems that emerged were:

a. how to finance literacy programmes,

b. the inadequacy of trained adult educators,

c. the difficulty of producing material needed for "work-oriented, functional literacy programmes",

d. the need for more scientific evaluation,

e. how to organise the transition from the experimental phase to the extensive application of functional literacy and, linked thereto, "integrating the functional literacy component into agricultural and industrial development schemes in areas of high literacy". This latter problem is felt by UNESCO to be probably the most important as well as the most difficult.

Building Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania; Ed. J. H. PROCTOR; *Tanzania Publishing House, for the University of Dar es Salaam*; pp. 69; Shs (T) 5.00.

Three members of the Ministry of Education, a history tutor, an official in the Ministry of External Affairs and a journalist each provide a Chapter describing a particular facet of Tanzania's new approach to rural development.

I. K. S. Musoke from the Dar es Salaam *Standard* reports candidly on the difficulties faced in the Bukoba area where the lesson needed clearly to be learnt is that a successful settlement scheme is not achieved by the mere physical act of moving people. The over-eager young, the over-reluctant old – each generation needs to be educated in the egalitarian faith if the Tanzania scheme is to progress as planned.

B. B. Bakula, from the Ministry of Education, urges a gradual approach as essential if the traditionalist peasants are to be wooed to a new philosophy of life.

If the efforts of the traditional Mutual Help societies can be harnessed to furthering the establishment of Ujamaa villages, E. N. Ntirukigwa suggests that a simple way will be open to further their success in Sukumaland. R. K. Mashauri, an Education Officer, believes in political education (of what he regards as the right sort), in resolving the apparent conflict between the Extension Services and Village Development Committees – an advocate for the theoretical party line, he sees nonetheless, a tough time ahead for Ujamaa villagers before they can hope truly to prosper. He believes in more self-help, less Central Government help, as the way to progress for the new villages.

A. W. M. Daraja, Ministry of External Affairs, comes to the surely sensible conclusion that it is too early to judge whether the role of Ujamaa Village in Tanzania rural development will be successful.

Finally, G. R. Mboya makes clear that the concept of villagers working and living together on a basis of equality, easier said than done, no doubt, in many areas, poses particularly difficult problems in the coffee growing Kihamba-land of the Chagga people on the slopes of Kilimanjaro. He closes with ominous words, which ominously perhaps bring this small volume to a close "whether persuasion will ultimately be adequate remains to be seen".

Guidelines for Co-operatives in Developing Economics, Ed. MARY JEAN MCGRATH; *International Co-operative Training Centre, University of Wisconsin, USA*; bibliographies, appendices, Notes; pp. 207.

This small book takes the form of five readings each by a specialist contributor on a particular facet of the Co-operative movement. These are: structure and organisation; financing; management; the role of government; education and training.

The authors concentrate principally on agriculture; as the editor remarks in her introduction, "the co-operative form of business is no panacea", but it does provide a movement which encourages the rural peasantry of the Third World, *inter alios*, to solve their own problems without for ever looking to others – governments, landlords, etc. – for solutions.

There is no attempt here to produce a profound analysis of co-operative theory and practice, but the basis of co-operatives is set out sensibly and clearly and the object of the exercise would seem to be achieved – guidelines to which members, personnel and officials with co-operative responsibilities can usefully refer.

The Growth of Co-operatives in Zambia – 1914/1971, by C. STEPHEN LOMBARD; *Manchester University Press* on behalf of the Institute of African Studies – Zambian Papers No. 6; tables, notes, references; pp. 40; £1.44.

The industrial complex of the Copperbelt and the consequences of the Brown award have stimulated rural/urban migration to such an extent that the most recent census actually recorded a population decline in certain rural regions.

Will the measures now adopted by the Zambian Government to stimulate rural development, allied to the effect of the Tanzam railway when this is opened, provide the much-needed encouragement for the rural areas and check the flow to the towns?

"Rural development is a top priority in our future development projects. Co-operatives will play a key role in this exercise. A co-operative approach is most suitable to rural development, both as a way of life and also as an instrument for accelerated development." President Kaunda's words early in 1971 are used as a preface to Stephen Lombard's short monograph.

December, 1970, saw a new Co-operative Societies Act pass into law in which there is welcome emphasis on the careful preparation needed before new societies are organised. The author believes that Co-operatives still offer Zambia the most suitable method of combining small farms into larger units. As Stephen Lombard concludes, co-operative organisation "fits in well with Zambia's philosophy of 'humanism', but humanism also requires efficiency if it is to be truly effective".

Restatement of African Law: 4 – Malawi, Land, Succession, etc., by J. O. IBIK; map, index; pp. 206; £5.00.

A new volume in the Restatement of African Law Project series, under the general editorship of Professor A. N. Allott at the School of Oriental and African Studies at London University, makes its very welcome appearance with the usual high standard of scholarship and clarity one associates with this Project.

This book is unique in that it is the first comprehensive statement of customary law in Malawi. One can but applaud the industry and care that have gone into the production of a reference work that will surely become the cornerstone upon which the orderly evolution of customary law in Malawi will depend. Since the bulk of the litigation which affects the common man and woman in Malawi in their daily lives is rooted in customary law, the production of this work must rank as a most significant contribution towards providing a framework within which, with wise guidance from the legislature, the customary law of the country can be developed to meet the stresses and strains which will inevitably result from increasing economic and social development.

African Soils; *Inter-African Bureau for Soils – OAU/STRC,* Vol. XV; pp. 754.

This volume contains the papers presented at the OAU Conference on the production of cereal crops in Africa, held in Nigeria at Zaria in 1970. Seventeen African countries were represented, together with France, India and the United States. There are more than 40 contributions, some individually and some jointly written by specialists. Overall a great deal of detailed information is contained on cereal crop production – mostly, but by no means solely in West Africa – which should provide a valuable source of reference to African agriculturalists throughout the Continent.

Financing the Small States in Australian Federalism, by R. J. MAY; *Oxford University Press;* appendices, bibliography, notes, index; pp. 235; £5·75.

When Australia adopted a federal form of government there were "marked disparities in size, wealth and economic development between the colonies". One way by which the smaller, poorer states were given a fair share of the national cake, a sop to their parochial pride and a counter to their secessionist feelings (at times very strong, particularly in Western Australia, also in Tasmania) was by the use of special grants paid by the federal government to claimant states – there were grants over and above those payments which all states were entitled to receive from the centre.

It is noteworthy that the Commonwealth government has consistently refused to interfere with the work of the Grants Commission whose recommendations Parliament has always accepted.

As the Nineteen Sixties drew to a close special grants to the three "small" states – Western Australia, Tasmania and Queensland – grew steadily less as a percentage of the total payments made by the federal government, though the quantum of grants themselves had increased – the percentage decrease indicates to some extent the economic progress of the small states in recent years. Nonetheless the Grants Commission has received an unexpected reprieve and an extension of its life for a further five years and indeed South Australia has once again become a claimant state for the first time since 1959/60.

Enchanted Frontiers, by NARI RUSTOMJI; *Oxford University Press;* illustrated, maps, appendix, index; pp. 333; £4.50.

Author and publishers combine to provide excellent entertainment. The illustrations, maps and typesetting all deserve praise, while Nari Rustomji fully merits a place with the best of earlier expatriate frontiersmen who fell in love with the mountains and the people of the hills and penned their tales and their reflections.

Joining the ranks of "the heaven born" of the ICS after education in Britain, Rustomji must have seemed a very anglicised official to some of his home-educated politically-minded young contemporaries. Occasionally the text sounds a little precious, but overall this volume presents a delightful picture of a happy man working hard on a difficult challenging job and providing his readers with rare insight into the life of an Indian administrator who straddled the era of independence and of whose guardianship of his parishioners Philip Mason would surely approve.

This is a book which is commended to the general reader; the student, scholar and researcher will also find it rewarding with its bonus of a unique on-the-spot account of the Chinese aggression in 1962.

The Administrative History of India – 1834/1947, by B. B. MISRA; *Oxford University Press;* bibliography and index; pp. 672; £10.00.

Dr. Misra has produced what may well prove to be a standard work for students of Indian history concerned with the processes of administration, in the century leading up to independence.

The administrative machinery whereby a great sub-continent obtained its government services was complex and interwoven (to mix the metaphor) with the effects of political pressures both in Britain and in India. There are those who believe that British Administration in India was over-concerned with the assessment and collection of taxes based on agricultural holdings and that this approach was one major reason why the Indian peasant was particularly susceptible to the lures of the money lender, thereby contributing to the great burden of peasant indebtedness. *Laissez-faire,* as Dr. Misra sees it, had in India a very different effect from that it created in Nineteenth Century Britain. The difference was, he considers, "caused largely by the presence of a foreign imperial power. But Indian society consisting . . . of mutually exclusive groups was no less responsible, it made the continuance of bureaucratic despotism an essential condition for its very existence". The author does not foresee a change in the citizen-administration relationship until social relationships are more closely integrated. Until then it seems the implementation of government policy in India will largely continue in the hands of paternalistic administrators.

The Economic Development of India under the East India Company, Ed. K. N. CHAUDHURI; *Cambridge University Press*, 1971; index; pp. 319; £6.40.

Mr. Chaudhuri has reproduced four Nineteenth Century papers which provide a mine of information for the students and economists about India's Nineteenth Century commercial development as seen through four very observant Western eyes. George Prinsep on the external commerce and exchanges in Bengal, writing with the self-assurance of a member of a family of Indian merchant traders and senior officials in India throughout the last century; Thomas Cooke, the noted economic theorist and co-founder with Malthus, Ricardo and James Mill, of the Political Economy Club; John Palmer, a Governor of the Bank of England and an East India merchant; John Crawford, administrator under Raffles in Java and with military service in India on the medical side.

We find Palmer the banker and merchant questioned (in 1832) before the Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company preferring bills of exchange to bullion, and such bills to a remittance of specie even though insured.

The currency problems of the day, the trading profits, the monetary system, invisible earnings, business failures, are all recounted by a contemporary pen. By the 1830s America already exceeded by over three times, the Indian production of cotton, Mauritius exported more sugar than India. This is a book full of surprising and interesting news, views and statistics.

West Indian Societies, by DAVID LOWENTHAL; *Oxford University Press*, 1972; table, map, bibliography, index; pp. 385; £4.50.

Few will disagree with Philip Mason's remark in the foreword that "if any attempt to deal with these (West Indian food and population) problems internationally is ever made, David Lowenthal's book will surely be prescribed reading for the planners". For the author has made a deep study of the history and the social development, the multitude of social constraints that for so long inhibited progress for the majority of Caribbean people, the majority not coloured white; the peculiar social problems as between gradations of colour.

In a world where hate and violence are so sadly prevalent, it is heartening to find one scholar who is convinced that in the Caribbean at any rate, West Indians do *believe* in multi-racialism and *make* local multi-racialism a reality. "This commitment distinguishes West Indian race relations from those in the United States as sharply as most Americans consider their own system to differ from the South African. In bald terms (he concludes) South Africans believe in and practise apartheid; Americans believe in integration and practise apartheid; West Indians believe in and practise integration". Certainly the casual visitor to the Caribbean will note, whatever local tensions may be, a lack of racial feeling which may surprise him as much as often he may be surprised by the extent of colour-consciousness.

An excellent bibliography adds to the value of a volume which will enhance the high repute of books published for the Institute of Race Relations in London. One can readily therefore forgive the distinguished Foreword-writer for his imaginative brief mention of Anguilla which does not quite accord with the facts.

East Indian in Trinidad, by YOGENDRA K. MALIK; *Oxford University Press*, 1971; tables, appendix, bibliography, index; pp. 199; £3.00.

Trinidad and Tobago form the only island group in the Caribbean with an important Asian minority. Can Trinidadian Asians avoid the post independence hostility that their kith and kin have faced in Burma, Ceylon and East Africa and which must place some degree of doubt on the multi-racial policies of Fiji?

Mr. Malik's mainly sociological study concludes that "a cultural ethnic minority, even though in a position to win political favour with the support of other minority groups, cannot succeed in doing so as long as it maintains cultural and social segregation". This is the lesson that Asians, alas, have so frequently failed to learn.

The Development of the Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770/1820, by EDWARD BRATHWAITE; *Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press,* 1971; maps, bibliography, index; pp. 374; £5.00.

Admirably produced, this volume provides a fascinating social study of Jamaica, spanning the last years of the slave trade and the aftermath of its abolition in 1807.

Dr. Brathwaite's scholarly yet entertaining study makes a very worthwhile addition to the historiography of the Caribbean.

Burden of Empire, by L. H. GANN and PETER DUIGNAN; *Hoover Institution Publications;* maps, bibliography, index; pp. 435; $3.95.

This is a new edition, in paperback, of the authors' controversial study of Colonial Africa first published in 1967 (reviewed briefly in the JAO Vol. 7, October, 1968).

The authors remain unrepentantly sympathetic towards the Colonial era and have added in a new 1971 preface their belief that Colonialism "was one of the most important and constructive chapters both in the annals of Africa and in the history of the World at large" – so at least the contemporary argument is not entirely one-sided, though few can doubt that Gann and Duignan will find themselves in the minority-view camp for a very long time to come.

Migrations, Myth and Magic from the Gilbert Islands; early writings of Arthur Grimble arranged by ROSEMARY GRIMBLE; *Routledge & Kegan Paul,* 1972; maps, diagrams, illustrations; pp. 316; £6.00.

Six pounds is by no means a high price to pay for such a delightful book, admirably produced and most pleasantly illustrated by Sir Arthur Grimble's daughter Rosemary, who gathered together these field notes and other writings of her father, and produced this collection of Gilbertese folklore, some of which might otherwise have been lost to the records.

The volume concludes with three interesting appendices, the first on Polynesian navigation, the second on ocean-going canoes, and the third on Gilbertese food for navigators.

The Evangelistic Bureaucrat, by JON GOWER DAVIES; *Tavistock Publications,* 1972; with plates, maps and appendix; index; pp. 239; £3.00.

The author's study of a planning exercise in Newcastle-upon-Tyne focuses on the relations between the crumbling, fading Rye Hill area and the Civic Centre responsible for an attempt at its resuscitation.

The ordinary citizen will be on the author's side as he criticises the bureaucratic planner for ignoring the feelings and the social needs of the poor. Clearly J. G. Davies became deeply involved in the Newcastle situation he found, hence a book that has a fervent subjective approach, understandably with issues so parochial – an approach that seems relatively little based on cool, calm, objective judgments.

The fervour makes lively reading and a short salutary chapter entitled "the oppression of progress", begins: "Part of the ideology of the planning profession casts the planner in the role of the natural enemy of those nineteenth-century robber-barons who, under the banner of *laissez-faire*, raped the fair countryside, spewed forth the unzoned filth of our industrial cities, and trampled underfoot the weak, the defenceless, the economically, politically, and socially impotent members of our society . . . (but in) many ways, planning departments are the natural heirs of nineteenth-century entrepreneurs. The profit motive which drove railway companies and commercial developers to destroy large numbers of the dwellings may seem to be far removed from the 'public interest' motivation of planners" – to the author, however, there is a very real parallel.

One can feel much sympathy with the author's very human, if angry-young-man approach to a major urban problem, but whether a research project recorded in this frame of mind, can carry conviction in academic circles, let alone in the quarters of the councillor or the civic bureaucrat, must be a matter of some doubt.

The Health Services of Ireland, by BRENDAN HENSEY; *Institute of Public Administration, Dublin;* appendices and index; pp. 238; £2.50.

Brendan Hensey has undertaken a major revision of his standard work on the health services of Eire, making this second edition to all intents and purposes a new one which now takes account of the widespread changes in the relevant law and particularly the many changes in the administration of the services, that have occurred since the book first appeared in 1959.

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